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Abstract 
 
For a country such as Armenia, shifts in population flows have significant long lasting 
implications on the economy and society. By assessing the most common and pertinent forms of 
labor migration across the world [specifically looking at examples of the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
and Pakistan – countries with established labor migration regimes] and identifying actors 
involved in the migration process this study unveils the socioeconomic significance of labor 
migration as a precursor to outright migration that is deemed to be one of the factors inhibiting 
Armenia’s development. Although social and economic processes are considered to move in 
tandem and should be studied as such, the paper argues that economic considerations exert 
primary influence on migratory decisions and geography. As such, an economic analysis 
framework of the labor migration processes is presented, encompassing the legal and social issues 
involved. Introducing a model for the temporary labor migration regime, the paper makes a strong 
argument in favor of instituting government-sponsored programs [state-managed regime] in 
Armenia with active Diaspora participation. It is crucial to remember that this paper is not 
looking into the political ramifications related to the sensitive issue of labor migration, but 
proposes a possible way out of the current economic stalemate. 
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Introduction 
Armenia has been consistently loosing its workforce to other countries.1 Migratory 
tendencies seem to be on the rise in the years following independence in 1991. In large 
part due to social issues, decisions to emigrate by Armenians have also more recently 
been affected by pure economic concerns. There is a well-defined trend of temporary 
[and seasonal] labor migration. The main destination appears to be Russia, a country 
that is relatively close to Armenia geographically, seen as a friendly state, has a vast 
growing capitalist economy, and last but not the least, maintains a visa free border entry 
regime with Armenia.  
Temporary labor migration from Armenia to Russia raises a number of issues including 
the legal status of migrants in the host country, their intentions upon completion of their 
contracts [as many, joined later by other family members from Armenia, tend to choose 
to remain in the host country]; as well as economic issues, with strong implications for 
labor markets, wage differentials, skill transfers in the economy and the flow of funds. 
To identify Armenian migrants’ profile the paper examines social concerns, human 
capital, employment, economic development, government policies and entrepreneurial 
activity in Armenia. Factors leading an individual to undertake seasonal or temporary 
work abroad are discussed to contribute to the analysis of migration impacts on host and 
home countries. Existing legal base is discussed and areas of improvement are pointed 
out in the paper. International experience proves that in order to shift labor migration 
processes out of illegal space into a legalized movement, a strong commitment is 
required on the part of both host and home economies. In the specific case of Armenia 
an argument is extended to include the Russian Armenian Diaspora that is economically 
and socially active in the Russian regions and may act as an intermediary in the 
negotiation and management process. Further, success stories from the international 
practice, utilized in this study [those of the established labor migration regimes e.g. 
Philippines, Sri Lanka and Pakistan], suggest that a well-defined regime of temporary 
labor migration is achievable and can in fact become beneficial for both the home and 
host country in terms of economics. In all instances the role of fiscal authorities is high 
and pivotal at various stages. 
                                                 
1 This statement is corroborated by the studies discussed in this paper and information 
available on the website of the State Department For Migration and Refugees of the 
Republic of Armenia: www.dmr.am - accessed December 13, 2005 
 3
The literature related to the issues of migration is abundant and as diverse in geography 
covered in certain studies as are the authors writing them. Yet a brief review of some of 
the indicative publications in the field prompts a striking disparity in the issues that are 
being analyzed by researchers across the world. Preference is usually given to studying 
the effects of permanent migration on a host country.2 This creates an additional 
impediment for the purposes of current analysis. As has been stressed before, this paper 
is primarily concerned with the effects of temporary labor migration on the home [or 
sending] country, i.e. Armenia.  
The problem of relative lack of developed literature on the issue of temporary migration 
vis-à-vis the home country is amplified by the absence of reliable cross-sectional data 
on migration patterns in the case of Armenia. Statistical accuracy as far as labor 
migration flows from and to Armenia, similar to the trending data available for the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, as well as, other countries, has yet to be developed 
and applied to Armenia. Nevertheless, an attempt is made, even in the absence of solid 
econometric models applied to the Armenian case, to certain theoretical generalizations 
and provide reasonable assessments pertaining to the issue at hand. With the hope of 
eventual availability of consistent statistical data the concepts presented below may 
become useful in developing a framework for future analysis of economic [and by 
extension social] impacts of temporary migration phenomenon on Armenia’s economy 
and society in the long run. 
Recent attempts by Armenian authorities to introduce certain controls over migratory 
processes can be regarded as the first positive steps to improve things. Streamlining 
labor migration and active involvement in the life of labor migrants abroad is a certain 
way to preserve the labor capacity of the Armenian society.  Otherwise the trend of 
current migration will be burdened with unresolved issues. This, in turn, will result in 
lost state revenues, antagonisms in host societies and destabilizing socio-economic 
environment at home. It is the authors’ belief that modern Armenia has an urgency to 
combat outward migration given the fact that human capital remains [and will most 
likely remain in the near term ] the country’s main resource ensuring its prosperous and 
consistent growth. The model presented at the end of the paper represents the authors’ 
modest attempt to bring efficiency, clarity and transparency to the process with a 
possibility of gains for all involved participants. 
                                                 
2 See, for example, among others studies done by Altonji and Card (1989), Borjas 
(1994, 2004), Friedberg (1994), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Ottaviano and Peri (2005), 
Tishkov et al (2005), etc. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 1 will discuss briefly best 
practices in the temporary labor migration regimes internationally. Specific examples of 
the efforts of the governments of the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Pakistan are discussed 
with strong implications for the Armenian case. Chapter 2 reviews the current statistical 
data available to determine a migrants’ profile and provide high-level explanation of 
main factors that lay at the core of the Armenian migration. Chapter 3 discusses current 
legal environment in Russia and Armenia, as well as, any existing bilateral treaties 
between the two countries in terms of migration and labor migration, in particular. 
Chapter 4 addresses some of the economic concerns of temporary labor migration in 
relation to the home country. The effects on labor markets, wage differentials and 
monetary inflows in Armenia are yet to be determined. An idea of a Pan-Armenian 
Bank that would engage in home infrastructure investment and distribute remittances 
funds to the migrants’ families is briefly discussed as well. However, a regulated 
temporary labor migration regime is argued to add more clarity to the analysis of the 
effects on the economy. Chapter 5 introduces the temporary labor migration model that 
can be applied within the Armenian context. A crucial role is assigned to the Armenian 
Diaspora organizations in Russia that will act as intermediaries between all involved 
participants. We summarize our findings in the conclusion. A few informative tables 
and charts are offered in the Appendices.  
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Chapter 1. Regulated Temporary Labor Migration Schemes: the Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, and Pakistan 
The subject of migration is a controversial one, with a high propensity of politicization. 
The effects of migration can be argued as either beneficial or detrimental to either host 
or home [or both] countries. According to some authoritative studies (Alburo and 
Abella, 2002), one could envision a situation under which both countries gain from a 
regulated temporary labor migration regime. Indirectly, migration may serve as an 
inspiration for individuals, who are left at home to improve their skills or gain 
additional education to find employment inside the home country and / or be eligible for 
foreign deployment. The consequences of that can be higher levels of human capital, 
and eventually positive impact on growth and income. The economy gains when the 
effects of the increased education and improved skills are spread beyond private gains. 
Often governments choose to regulate that process making it more beneficial and 
deriving extra economic and social benefits for the state. In some cases, as we will see, 
temporary migrants’ labor represents live revenue for all parties involved. All of these 
considerations will be important in the analysis of the labor migration process within 
the Armenian context. 
Box 1.1 
In Europe, migration for ordinary employment purposes under contract auspices that are 
limited in time first took place on a large scale when individuals from the backward 
Mediterranean countries moved North to countries such as Belgium, France, and 
Germany. Contract migrants can now be found in many countries. International contract 
migration is practiced in various parts of the world, for example, the vineyards of 
France and California, the construction sites of Switzerland and the hotels of the 
Caribbean.  
Source: Abella, 1997 
Today, practically every country in the world has its own view on migration processes 
and especially labor migration. Policies implemented in those countries are based on the 
prevalent views and current circumstances in the society. Governments of developing 
countries have long since recognized the important benefits [that outweigh the costs] of 
a more controlled labor migration process. In our analysis of known migration 
regulatory schemes across the world, we would like to emphasize the examples of the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.  These three countries have successfully 
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established controls over labor migration processes and have put in place policies that 
regulate work-abroad programs for their citizens. All three countries are small, with the 
main resource being their people – what is known as human capital.3 This characteristic 
situation becomes valuable in our analysis and can be reasonably applied to the 
Armenian framework. We begin our review with the Philippines. 
Philippines  
The Philippines government sees temporary labor migration as the foreign policy 
priority in both bilateral and regional trade negotiations. The Philippines experienced a 
huge outflow of high and low skilled workers during the last several decades. Before 
the 1970’s these outflows were sporadic and largely unorganized. The determining 
factor of the migration process was mainly the initiative of the individual to work 
abroad. In the mid-seventies, largely in response to increased demand for contract 
workers by the oil exporting countries of the Middle East, the Philippines government 
established control over the temporary contract workers flows by instituting a 
regulatory system overseeing the process.4  
There are public and private components to the system, which still operate today. 
Licenses are issued to the Philippines agencies to recruit workers. That represents the 
private part of the program. On the other hand the Philippines Overseas Employment 
Administration (POEA) is the institution that manages temporary migration.5 This 
agency regulates the work of Filipinos abroad under the authority of the government. 
The main responsibility of that agency is to provide contract labor to foreign employers. 
The main destinations of Filipino workers are to Middle Eastern, Asian and European 
countries. The main message of the project is that government is trying to prevent its 
citizens from using the unregulated channels to migrate. 6  In order to leave the country 
to work abroad, Filipinos must be accepted into the program by either a licensed 
recruiter, a specialized government agency, or must have their contract approved by the 
                                                 
3 Certainly, the definition of human capital includes collective skills, education, health 
and other aspects of the society. 
4 Alburo and Abella (2002) 
5 There are also permanent migrants to abroad who are registered and recorded by 
another government agency - the Commission on Filipino Overseas. 
6 The project official website is www.poea.gov.ph - Accessed 11/26/05 
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POEA and enroll in the official benefits program.7 In 2000 over twenty-five thousand 
workers went abroad on such "independent" contracts. Incidentally, the government 
prohibits its citizens to overstay visas in host countries.  It maintains a list of workers 
who have violated the conditions of their deployment and are therefore banned from 
future contracts.  In large part this is done in order to support the government’s efforts 
to market Filipinos abroad as a worldwide high-quality "brand name" of migrant labor.8   
As in every regulatory policy there are certain advantages and disadvantages to such a 
project. For the Philippines, migration and remittances represent a significant input in 
the growing economy. People are richer after returning home. That allows for additional 
investment projects to be carried out within the country. The returning workers have 
new skills as a result of the migration experience. At least some proportion of the 
workers actively put their new knowledge and skills to use at home thus engaging either 
in business or manufacture. Additionally, workers transfer their money from abroad 
through government institutions, which encompasses 8.4% of GDP.9  
On the other hand, there is a persistent inequality in the country that is considered poor. 
Another major problem is that often after their return workers do not actually engage in 
economic activity at home and do not put the skills which they obtained abroad to work.  
Instead, they wait for their next overseas deployment. By that critics conclude, the 
effects of such regulated migration do not really create any new jobs at home or 
contribute to economic growth.  On the contrary, this situation contributes to deeper 
inequality by enriching only a certain group of people.   
However, making rash conclusions is a sure way to forgo the measurable gains that the 
country with a large population, such as the Philippines, obtains in terms of additional 
money in the economy through remittances and growing human capital capacity, a large 
portion of which is not involved in the migration process and works at home.  
The Philippines example offers valuable conclusions for the Armenian case. The 
regulated migration regime is well developed and works in the Philippines, with real 
                                                 
7 Pre-migration training on social and work conditions abroad, the insurance and 
pension plans, and other sorts of benefits for the migrant and his/her family. These 
benefits are executed by another government agency – the Overseas Workers Welfare 
Administration. 
8 According to O’Neil (2004) the Philippines government protects its citizens, working 
abroad, from abuse and discouraging illegal recruitments.  
9 O’Neil (2004) 
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and aggregate positive effects outweighing the negatives. Next, we present a controlled 
labor migration pattern of Sri Lanka. 
Box 1.2 
Skilled migrants from Software Industry in India 
In 2002 a survey of companies in the Indian software industry on various management, 
skill and labor market related issues, produced curious results in terms of implications 
of skilled labor migration from India. Those workers with higher skills had higher 
propensity to migrate to developed countries, with majority of workers going to the 
host country firms with which the sending firm had some form of prior connection. 
Across all skill types, roughly 20 per cent went in response to direct job offers, with 
around 70 per cent being recruited through an agency or so-called body-shoppers. 
The interesting observation is that survey results indicated that an overwhelming 
majority of respondents indicated that their firm did not materially suffer from the 
consequences of such migration. In fact, for the Indian software sector as a whole, 60 
per cent viewed migration as having exerted a positive effect. A possible explanation 
found in the conclusions of the study mention that around 40 per cent of respondents 
signaled that improving access to cutting edge technology had constituted a major 
benefit. Improvements in working habits, access to new information and customers in 
developed countries were cited by around a quarter of the firms as being a benefit. At 
the same time, the survey indicated that investment by migrating workers back into the 
Indian software sector, as well as remittances and an overall improvement in the 
quality of the labor supply had occurred. Further, nearly a quarter of firms reported that 
they retained links with workers that had gone abroad. The dominant form of such 
links was either through migrants or their new employers using the firm as a sub-
contractor or vice versa, as well as migrants and their new firms being customers of the 
original Indian firm. 
Source: Commander, Chanda, Kangasniemi and Winters (2004) 
 
Sri Lanka 
Faced with similar problems similar to the Philippines [as Armenia faces now] and in 
line with the reasoning of the Philippines government, the Department of Labor of Sri 
Lanka had sought to establish a regulated form of migration of the Sri Lankan 
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population. In Sri Lanka economic migration was the major reason for a high outflow 
of people, especially women. In order to bring the migration flows under state control, 
The Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) was established in 1985 in 
order to regulate private employment agencies and also offer protection for individuals 
working abroad. Additionally, the Association of Licensed Foreign Employment 
Agencies (ALFEA) was established as an advisory agency to the SLBFE. ALFEA 
includes Licensed Foreign Employment Agencies that are supervised by the SLBFE at 
all times. It is estimated that around 99% of all recruitment agencies in Sri Lanka are 
private10 and they are regulated by SLBFE through the licensing system.11 Accredited 
Sri Lankan Recruitment Agencies are professional organizations that maintain strong 
working relationships with the Bureau.  
There is also explicit statistical data, as in the case of the Philippines, regarding the 
destination and gender of the people migrating abroad for work.12 The total numbers of 
departures from Sri Lanka for foreign employment has increased by 1.7% from slightly 
less than two hundred and ten thousand in 2003 to over two hundred thirteen thousand 
in 200413 (with distribution between genders being: 63% female and 37% male 
workers). 14  
Sri Lanka is putting a lot of effort in protecting its workers abroad. Bilateral agreements 
between countries providing terms and rules of settlement of employee grievances and 
the recognition of employment contracts constitute some of the main priorities of the 
SLBFE.15 To curb any illegal activity and offer sufficient protection the Sri Lankan 
                                                 
10 In fact one agency, Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Agency Ltd., is operating under 
the ministry of Labor of Sri Lanka subject to all regulations applied to private 
organizations. 
11 Mughal and Padilla (2005) 
12 See Table 1.2 in Appendix 
13 SLBFE’s official website www.slbfe.lk - Accessed: 11/23/05 
14 Mughal and Padilla (2005) note that this practice has had detrimental effects on 
migrating female workers.  According to the researchers women’s experience has been 
quite dim due to reports of abuse, torture and sexual exploitation in the Persian Gulf 
countries where the majority of women work.  Steps are to be taken at the government 
level by both Sri Lanka and the receiving countries to minimize abuses and suffering of 
the women. 
15 Incidentally, Mughal and Padilla (2005) note that SLBFE introduced a new form of 
contract specifying the rights and duties of the contractors. However, the new form was 
objected to by the recruitment agencies and its implementation was postponed. The 
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government requires that all migrants are registered with SLBFE. As its core benefits 
SLBFE provides free insurance (health, repatriation and disability), training and 
awareness programs, payment of embarkation tax, provision of scholarships for workers 
children, career guidance, and monitoring the process of their education, setting up 
runaway houses in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to accommodate women who have been 
compelled to leave their places of employment; and also providing the Sri Lankan 
embassies in the Middle Eastern host countries with Labor Welfare Offices. Another 
country in the region, which adopted “strict” controls over regulated labor migration is 
Pakistan, its case is discussed in the next section of the paper. 
Pakistan  
With an aim to establish employment opportunities for Pakistani citizens seeking 
overseas deployment and in order to control and regulate labor migration flows, the 
Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment (BEOE) was established as a 
centralized agency by order of the president in 1972. The Bureau is governed by a set of 
laws16 and is entrusted to implement its policies on a systematic and planned basis. The 
BEOE adheres to two basic goals: to combat unemployment in Pakistan and to earn 
foreign exchange through salary remittances from workers abroad. The objectives of the 
BEOE comprise implementation of foreign employment policies; protection of migrant 
workers’ rights abroad; enhancement of remittances sent back and directing them to 
cover the balance of payments deficit and development of national project; lessening 
unemployment pressures at home; and contributing to Pakistan’ prosperity through 
achieving transparency of the foreign employment process and utilization of legal 
channels to assist in sending workers abroad. 17  
The Ministry of Labor, Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis has established its agencies, 
called Community Welfare Attaches (CWAs), in countries with large concentrations of 
Pakistani workers. The CWAs are in charge of practically all issues concerning 
Pakistani workers in their host countries. They provide support to the temporary 
workers and assist with repatriation and resolution of legal questions that arise at a 
migrant’s workplace. The office of the Protector of Emigrants regulates the activities of 
                                                                                                                                               
main reason of the objection was the lengthy administrative process that it introduced.  
That in turn would discourage workers, seeking a less formal and speedy departure 
abroad, from participating in government controlled migration scheme. 
16 Emigration Ordinance and the Emigration Rules (both issued in 1979) 
17 www.beoe.gov.pk - Accessed: 11/20/05 
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the overseas promoters and agents. Overseas employment promoters and agents are 
always encouraged by government to boost the export of manpower from Pakistan 
through legal channels.  
Since 1999 over 270,000 people have been sent to work abroad through the Overseas 
Employment Promoters (OEPs), that reports to the BEOE An average of over one 
billion USD per year has been received through remittances in the last five years.18 At 
the same time the number of female Pakistanis, willing to work abroad, is insignificant, 
compared to male migrants.19 
Similar to the Sri Lankan case there are private recruiting agencies that hire workers for 
deployment abroad. The Government of Pakistan applies stringent criteria for granting 
licenses to these agents and overseas employment promoters in the country. According 
to the information found on the official Ministry of Labor website, the Overseas 
Employment Corporation [established 1976 to promote employment in the public sector 
abroad] has sent over six thousand Pakistanis to work on a government-to-government 
basis. The Corporation maintains a data bank and a website with background 
information on registered professionals, skill, semi-skill and un-skilled workers. That 
enables to quickly match a worker with a particular skill set with new opportunities 
abroad.   
In order to facilitate overseas employment and to safeguard the interests of overseas 
workers the Emigration Rules of 1979 have been simplified.  With an interest in 
improving effectiveness of CWAs posted in Pakistani missions abroad the ministry has 
established a systematic mechanism for monitoring and evaluation of their performance 
by fixing targets for enhancing manpower export from Pakistan.20   
Conclusion 
Many of the developing countries that possess few resources but have large [and 
growing] labor markets and face a natural exodus of population utilize regulatory 
measures to control labor migration trends. Usually, it is the economic rationale that 
                                                 
18 Data from: 
http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/ministries/ContentInfo.jsp?MinID=27&cPath=346_562&C
ontentID=2213  - Accessed: 11/20/05 
19 That estimation is different from the case of Sri Lanka, where the migration of 
women is twice bigger then the migration of men. 
20 www.pakistan.gov.pk/ministries - Accessed: 11/15/05 
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influences decisions to migrate. Earlier unregulated outflows of workers experienced by 
those countries prompted such policies. In a large number of cases such population loss 
resulted in permanent emigration. All of the countries discussed above established 
organizations responsible for regulating private agencies. Licensing of those agencies 
has brought a substantial amount of resources by charging simple licensing fees. 
Importantly, the regimes of temporary labor migration have encouraged skill transfers 
between those who stay at home and those who migrate. The regulated regimes have 
also induced the potential migrants to acquire additional skills and education. Yet, many 
remain in their home countries engaging in economic activity inaccessible to them 
without those skills. Finally, remittances that workers abroad send home bring foreign 
currency to the countries and increase consumption spending and investments. The 
effect is particularly strong if these remittances are regulated, and required to be sent to 
the home country only through the government bank (e.g. Philippines).  
Armenia with its main resource being its human capital, can gain a great deal from the 
examples of those countries and others in establishing its own policy of regulating the 
outflow of the labor. However, simple emulation is simply inadmissible in this 
controversial question. Only full understanding of the different instances from different 
countries, and understanding the consequences of those policies in the local context, can 
help Armenia design its own policy, which will be beneficial for this small and resource 
limited country. A first step in such a design must be a clear understanding of migration 
trends and patterns from Armenia.  In the next section we make a brief introduction to 
this issue based on the several official surveys conducted in Armenia over the course of 
past few years. 
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Chapter 2. Patterns of Labor Migration from Armenia 
Armenians have traditionally migrated to other countries in the search of economic 
opportunities. Russia has been one of the major magnets for Armenian migrants due to 
a number of factors commonly treated as a mutual historical background. The 
Krasnodar, Stavropol, and Rostov regions in Southern Russia, as well as major urban 
centers with Moscow and the Moscow region as their core have become a second home 
to several generations of Armenians. This trend is largely due to family and cultural 
ties, common past, the lack of language barrier, comparable education systems, the lack 
of a visa regime, and other factors. 21 Historically, migration of Armenian nationals has 
been very sporadic and network-oriented, i.e. the presence of Diaspora has always been 
critical for the determination of migrants’ destination. Closed to mass immigration from 
outside its borders, the Soviet Union placed restrictions on the internal movement of 
people, thus limiting the prospects of ethnic groups rapidly coming into contact in large 
numbers at the neighborhood or city/district level.22 Armenian migrants, however, 
always managed to assemble in communities on the territory of the Russian Federation, 
thus, creating networks favorable to new migrants of Armenian ethnicity.  
In the 1970s, migration patterns in Armenia changed from immigration to emigration.23 
If before this period Armenians from other Soviet republics were moving back to 
Armenia, in the 1970s when economic growth started to decline and up to the late 
1980s, when then situation was aggravated by the beginning of the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict, Armenians started to leave the country in search of economic prospects. 
Consequently, two types of migration emerged: permanent emigration abroad to the 
United States and Europe, and seasonal migration to the neighboring republics of the 
                                                 
21 From the ARKA News Agency interview with G. Yeganyan, Head of the Department 
of Migration and Refugees: “Migration in Armenia is of seasonal character. [In early] 
spring the number of people leaving Armenia grows, as people [are] in the quest of 
seasonal jobs. In June … our department records a positive balance: … [during] 
summer holidays most people want their children to spend holidays in their motherland.  
In the fall, on the contrary, the negative balance grows … At the end of fall again 
positive balance is recorded: seasonal workers return from abroad. By the New Years’ 
the number of people coming to Armenia exceeds those leaving it, as most people want 
to spend the holiday with their families. … 90% of people leave for Russia … [as there 
is] no visa regime, no language obstacles, and there are trade relations [between the two 
countries].”  
22 M. Alexseev, 2005 
23 A. Yeghiazarian, et al., 2003 
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former Soviet Union. The first wave of mass emigration started as a result of the 
earthquake of 1988. The second one was a consequence of the war in Nagorno 
Karabakh. With the break-up of the Soviet Union most of these refugees moved to 
Russia. The shocks of the late 1980s caused massive unemployment and accompanying 
emigration. Approximately 20% of the 1990 population of nearly 3.4 million people 
emigrated abroad.24 Until 2002, Armenia experienced an outflow of 14-24% of its 
population.25 This chapter will present the pattern of the total outflow of migrants and 
the description of labor migration trends, for the last decade. It will identify the socio-
economic profile of labor migrants from Armenia. Besides the age, gender, family 
status, and education level of migrating labor, the main reasons for departure will be 
identified.  
Population Dynamics and the Total Flow of Emigrants  
According to official statistics, the picture of population dynamics since 1990 up to 
present appears as follows: the total population size was growing slightly up to the end 
of the 1990s (See Table 2.1). If we were to rely on the government data, the population 
size dropped by 600,000 people in 2000. Since then the number of Armenian nationals 
decreased slightly by about 2000 persons a year and grew in 2004 to comprise 3,215.8 
thousand persons. During the whole period of the 1990s up to the present, the 
proportion of females only slightly surpassed the number of males with the latter 
comprising around 48% of the total population. The correlation of urban population to 
rural population has been at approximately the same level with a ratio of 2 to 1. The 
percentage of economically active population has dropped by 13.2% for the last decade 
to comprise 61.4% of the number of labor resources in 2003. The latter comprised 
2,008.04 thousand persons or slightly less than two thirds of the total population size in 
2003.  
The number of unemployed, officially, has been at a steady 5 to 8 % of labor resources 
since the beginning of the 1990s. The unemployment level in Armenia made up 8.8% 
by late April, 2005.26 According to the National Statistical Service, 135,800 people 
were registered by Armenia's employment services by the end of April of the current 
                                                 
24 E. Gelbard, 2005 
25 IOM, Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; 2001-2002 Review 
26 Unemployment rate in Armenia is calculated as the ratio between the number of 
registered unemployed people and the economically active population (the amount of 
the working and unemployed people).  
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year. 96.4% or 130,900 people of them are the unemployed. 103,200 people or 78.8% 
received unemployed status, of which 56.5% were women. In April of 2005, the 
average number of economically active individuals in the population was 1,203,800 
people. 1,097,600 (91.2%) of them were employed or had other social occupations, and 
106,200 (8.8%) had no permanent jobs, were registered by the Republican Employment 
Service and had unemployment status. Alternative sources cite unemployment rates 
between 14 and 30%.27  
 Without making distinction between categories of migrants the picture of the total 
outflow of migrants heading toward Russia looks as follows.28 Despite the fact the total 
number of migrants arriving into Russia was changing significantly over the years, the 
ratio of migrants from Armenia to Russia has been at approximately the same level 
since 1997, i.e., 2%-4.5% of both the total number of immigrants into Russia and the 
number of migrants from CIS (Table 2.2). We also further juxtaposed the data on the 
total number of migrants, from the two official sources (Table 2.3), and it became 
apparent that the two sources provide conflicting numbers, e.g. see the years 1997 and 
2000. While both sources provide information on the total number of migrants (not 
differentiating between migrant categories), the Armenian official sources suggest that 
the total number of migrants to the CIS comprised 8.1 and 11.1 thousand persons in 
1997 and 2000, respectively. At the same time, in accordance with the Russian official 
data, the number of migrants from Armenia comprised 19.1 and 15.9 thousand persons 
in 1997 and 2000, respectively. The discrepancy might be caused by the differences in 
the collection of data. The data since 2001 looks more promising, and the similar 
comparison allows concluding that over 50% (progressively growing into the prevailing 
share) of migrants from Armenia (without differentiation between migrant categories) 
from 1997 to 2003 have chosen Russia as their destination. 
  
                                                 
27 Estimates presented in RFE/RL Caucasus and CIA Factbook. See Chart 4.1 for 
Armenia’s unemployment rate trend estimates from the International Financial 
Statistical Database. 
28 Because our focus is on Armenians heading toward the Russian Federation, we will 
leave migrants having chosen other destinations outside the scope of this study. Using 
the available official estimates (the National Statistical Service of Armenia and the 
Federal Statistic Service of Russia) we analyzed the outflow of migrants from Armenia 
since the early 1990s.  
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Labor Migrants in the Total Outflow of Migrants   
In order to adopt sound migration policies on the regulation of labor migration one 
needs to obtain a current picture of the phenomenon, identify a socio-economic profile 
of the average migrant and trace current migration trends. It is important to ask who the 
labor migrants from Armenia are, what their educational and professional status is, how 
age and gender characteristics affect migration trends, and what all this information 
tells us in terms of the long-term effects on human capital development in Armenia. 
According to recent surveys on labor migration from Armenia, the most popular 
destination has been the CIS and Russia, in particular. The most obvious reasons for 
that were mentioned above. In total, 90,1% of the labor migrants have worked in the 
CIS countries, including Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan; 94,4% of them have resided 
in urban settlements. 43,1% of all surveyed migrants reported Moscow as their 
preference. Other popular destinations are St. Petersburg, Tumen, Chelyabinsk, and 
Rostov-na-Donu, with the number of labor migrants to each of the mentioned cities 8 
times less that that recorded for Moscow.29 The overwhelming majority of labor 
migrants found jobs in the CIS; approximately every third labor migrant that did not 
choose to work in the CIS has migrated to the USA.30 According to the same survey, the 
majority of Armenian labor migrants to the EU and the USA come from Yerevan. 
Within the group of labor migrants who migrate to the EU and the USA the ratio of 
migrants from urban areas of Armenia to those from rural settlements is about 4:1 
(Table 2.4).  
The distribution of migrant contingents by gender and age provides interesting insights 
about the profile of migrants (Table 2.5). The proportion of females who have worked 
in the EU and the USA is much higher that that of males (3.4 times higher in case of the 
EU and 4.3 times higher in case of the USA).  The overwhelming majority of labor 
migrants are of age 21-50 with roughly every third Armenian labor migrant belonging 
in the 41-50 age group.  The mean age for males and females is 38.2.  The bottom age 
of both male and female migrants is 20, the oldest male migrants are aged 69 and 
                                                 
29 Advanced Social Technologies (AST), “Labor Migration from Armenia, 2002-2005”, 
funded by OSCE Office in Yerevan and supported by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Issues of the Republic of Armenia: 18 
30 Ibid., 19. (the study covered only those migrants who lived and worked abroad for a 
certain period of time).  
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females – 56. Additionally, the mean age of those that work(ed) in the EU and the USA 
(44.8) is higher than of those who migrated to the CIS countries (38.5).31   
With regards to employment status and industry breakdown of Armenian migrants at 
home, approximately half (50.7%) of labor migrants were involved in some income 
activity before their first trip abroad.  64.6% of them had permanent jobs, and 35.4% 
relied on finding occasional employment (Table 2.6). The study assumes that “at least 
for every third labor migrant the act of migration could not be conditioned by lack of a 
workplace”.32  On the other hand, a government-funded study shows 19.0% of arriving 
short-term trip passengers and 25.2% of departing short-term trip passengers as 
unemployed. Additionally, this last study sees every third passenger among RA citizens 
as unemployed.33  
Main Reasons for Departure 
Migration reasons for age groups follow the subsequent pattern. 34 For teenagers (those 
up to 20 years of age) a family reunion was the main reason for leaving the country, 
they are moderately motivated to emigrate by lack of vacancies and unhealthy moral 
environment; and they deem lack of work by specialty and impossibility to earn enough 
funds to provide for their subsistence less serious reasons to leave. In the meantime, the 
20-49 and of 50+ groups were more or less united in their answers. While both groups 
named lack of vacancies and inability to earn a decent living among the top reasons for 
emigration, both groups are equally moderately oppressed by the lack of work by 
specialty and the unhealthy moral environment. Meanwhile, while the respondents of 
the 20-49 group turned out to be motivated by family reunion to a lesser extent than the 
older generation, the latter is more optimistic about the future of Armenia’s economy. A 
small percentage of the survey participants named a geopolitically unstable situation 
and difficulties to carry out entrepreneurship among other reasons for departure.  
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 21 
33 “Report On Sample Survey Of Passenger Turnover (Migration) At The Border 
Guarding Posts Of The Republic Of Armenia”, NSSRA jointly with European Union’s 
TACIS Program and the IOM, 2003 
34 By the results of the survey recorded in the NSS Yearbook 1997-2004 (the survey 
was conducted to reflect the main reasons for departure from Armenia in 1991-1998; 
the participants were divided into three age categories and sex groups) 
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As to the motives based on gender differences, significant disproportion is observed 
among the participants naming lack of work places and family reunion as the main 
reasons for departure. The general assumption is that men leave the country first, and 
women join them in subsequent stages of emigration. In terms of official statistics, 
while the number of females leaving the country for the lack of work is half as much as 
the same number of males, a roughly sixfold number of females tend to leave for the 
sake of reunification with their families.  
Russia’s Interest In Labor Migration From Armenia  
As it has been shown, the Russian Federation is the primary destination of labor 
migrants from the CIS, including Armenia. The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe speculates that Russia’s declining population could become a serious 
limitation on its ability to meet its growth target of doubling GDP over the next ten 
years.35 The Goskomstat estimates that on 1 September, 2005 total population 
comprised 143,0 million people having decreased by 506,4 thousand people (0,35%) 
since the beginning of the year. The population numbers decreased due to natural 
decrease of the population, which by January-August of 2005 increased 51 thousand 
people since the same period of last year.36 Some experts predict that from 2006 to 2010 
Russia's economically active population will reduce by one million a year and further 
states that 30 to 50 percent of labor migrants are currently employed in professions 
which local population prefers to ignore.37 The decline in population can result in labor 
market shortages and increased dependency. While migration is compensating for the 
depopulation of many regions, construction and service work have absorbed large 
numbers of foreign workers in major urban centers, particularly in and around Moscow. 
Meanwhile, in 2002 it was said there were 12 to 15 million migrants in Russia, 
                                                 
35 “Strengthening the Rights-Based Framework For Managing Migration” citing 
UNECE (2004) 
http://www.ilo.ru/news/200502/files/migrationpaper1Budapest14FEBeng.pdf - 
accessed on July 10, 2005 
36 Goskomstat - http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/brus05/IssWWW.exe/Stg/05-01.htm - 
Accessed on November 29, 2005. 
37 Estimated by Elena Tjurjukanova, leading researcher at the Institute for Socio-
Economic Problems of Population at the Russian Academy of Sciences - 
http://www.ilo.ru/news/200507/001.htm - accessed on September 10, 2005. 
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according to various estimates.”38 1 to 3,5 million of them were illegal labor migrants.39 
How large is the portion of Armenian nationals among these labor migrants? 
According to recent statistics, Armenia is in fifth place after Ukraine, Moldova, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, by the number of labor migrants having worked in the 
Russian Federation from January to June in the last two years (Table 2.7). According to 
the data provided by the RF Federal Migration Service, the total number of labor 
migrants from Armenia comprised 11,8 thousand people, or 7.3% of the total number of 
migrants from CIS, in January-July of 2004.  The total official number of labor 
migrants has grown by the end of the same period in 2005, comprising 19,5 thousand 
persons or 8.3% of the total amount of labor from the CIS. Interestingly enough, the 
share of Armenian workers has remained at the same level in the last two years, while 
the absolute number of Armenian nationals employed in Russia has grown almost 
twofold.  
                                                 
38 As stated by Victor Ivanov, deputy chief of the president’s administration charged 
with “improving the migration policy” - from the transcript of the all-Russia 
Extraordinary Congress in defense of migrants, held in the State Duma (Russian 
Parliament) in June 2002. 
39 As stated by A. Pochinok, Minister of Labour and Social Development 
http://www.government.gov.ru/data/news_text.html?he_id=15&news_id=8799 - 
published on 13.02.2003 at the official website of the RF Government.   
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Chapter 3. The Legal Status of Armenian Labor Migrants in Russia:  
Review of Legislation  
This chapter has a twofold objective: to assess the current legislative and administrative 
frameworks in the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation in the area of labor 
migration and review international obligations of the RA and RF in the field of labor 
migration. The assessment of legislative and administrative frameworks required 
gathering legal and administrative documents inclusive of draft laws and passed legal 
acts. The review of international obligations of the RA and RF required collecting 
relevant international treaties and agreements inclusive of clauses on foreign labor and 
labor migration. Both assessments have been completed to evaluate the influence of the 
existing legislation on Armenian migrants arriving in the Russian Federation.  
Are Armenian Migrants Welcome in the Host Country?  
The history of migration laws in Russia allows observing a strategy of curbing the flow 
of migrants.40 In accordance with the federal law “Regarding the legal status of foreign 
citizens in the Russian Federation” (in force since 1 November 2002) 41, the 
Government of the Russian Federation starting from 2003 has been establishing quotas 
on the issue of permits for temporary residence in Russia to foreign citizens and 
stateless persons42 and quotas on the invitations for work in Russia (Table 3.1).43 The 
Law envisages for these quotas to be suggested by the local executive bodies of the 
administrative bodies44 of the Russian Federation. The 2002 Federal Law provides for a 
quota of authorizations for a temporary stay of up to 3 years. Applications are processed 
during six months. Approved applicants cannot change their place of residence within 
the administrative body of the Russian Federation in which they are entitled to stay 
                                                 
40 Trend not unfamiliar to many European countries. 
41 Hereinafter “The Federal Law 2002” 
42 Mandate of the Government of the Russian Federation, N 790 “On the quota on the 
issue of temporary residence permits to foreign citizens and individuals without 
citizenship” and respective decrees for the following years 
http://govportal.garant.ru:8081/SESSION/S__kF7B82zW/PILOT/main.htm  accessed 
on September 10, 2005 
43 Mandate of the Government of the Russian Federation, 30 October 2002 N 782 "On 
the establishment of quota on the issue of invitations to enter the Russian Federation for 
employment purposes” and respective mandates for the following years 
44 Official name for an administrative unit in Russian Federation  
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(Art. 11) and cannot seek employment outside of that body (Art. 13). Besides, the law 
provides for “temporary stay” (Art. 5), which comprises 90 days for migrants entitled to 
visa-free entry. The local bureaus of the Interior Ministry make decisions on any 
modification in this timeframe. All migrants should receive migrant IDs, pay taxes on 
invitations to enter the Russian Federation, for authorizations on temporary stay, for the 
use of a foreign worker or for employment authorization. 
Article 16 of the 2002 Federal Law determines guarantees of medical, material and 
housing provisions to the foreign citizen for the period of the foreign citizens’ 
employment in Russia. Such guarantees are pledges written by the inviting 
party/employer, who can be anyone from international organizations and their 
representatives in the Russian Federation to legal entities and Russian citizens. The 
inviting party is expected, by this law, to provide a guarantee of its ability to provide the 
foreign worker with (1) a subsistence minimum in accordance with the legislation of the 
respective subject of the Russian Federation, as well as funds sufficient to enter and exit 
the Russian Federation for the period of the foreign worker’s stay in Russia; (2) social 
security and medical insurance, agreed upon as it is provided for in the international 
agreement between the two countries or, if not envisaged by the international 
agreement, funds to cover such medical expenses.45 It should be noted that despite the 
existing provisions, violation of migrant’s rights by employers is not rare.46  
The Russian Government vested authority to manage labor migration in the Federal 
Migration Service of the Interior Ministry of the Russian Federation.47 Additionally, the 
                                                 
45 Stipulation on the guarantees of material, medical and housing provision to foreign 
citizens and individuals without citizenship for the period of their stay in the Russian 
Federation  (the RF government mandate, 24 March 2003 г. N 167). 
46 Consider the following conclusions of a study on the rights of labor migrants in 
Russia: “Migrants' labor is gradually accreting with the "shadow" economy. At least 2/3 
of migrant employment belongs to the "gray" zone (less than 20% of migrant workers 
have a written contract with an employer; 74% noted that they receive their salary in so-
called "black cash". Violations of migrants' labor rights (extremely long working day, 
the full or partly absence of salary, exhausting work, limitation of the right to dismissal) 
are of mass character. Also such forms of rights' violations as constraining the freedom 
of movement, physical and psychological harassment, debt servitude (12%), seizure of 
documents (20%), sex-exploitation (22% of female migrants). (Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, 
E. Tjurjukanova, 2004) 
47 FMS is an independent structure of the Interior Ministry, whose stated goals are to 
elaborate and apply measures on regulation of foreign labor migration, attraction of 
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Ministry of Interior shall perform functions of a federal executive migration service 
agency and is authorized to “elaborate proposals as regards the principal areas of state 
migration and the ways to improve the legal management of migration-related issues; to 
coordinate the activities of federal executive agencies and executive agencies of the RF 
constituent members aimed at the implementation of the state migration policy; to take 
measures, in accordance with the RF legislation and RF international treaties, in the 
sphere of management of external labor migration with the objective of enlisting 
foreign labor force to work in Russia and ensuring job placement of RF citizens outside 
the Russian Federation; to elaborate and implement measures to prevent and curb illegal 
migration, to carry out immigration control with regard to foreign nationals and 
stateless persons; to draft proposals on the allocation of funds from the federal budget 
according to the duly established procedure and identification of other sources of 
financing for the purpose of implementation of the state migration policy and exercise 
control over spending of the designated funds; to participate, within its terms of 
reference, in the development and implementation of RF international treaties in the 
sphere of migration.”48 The authority to grant hiring permits and employment 
authorizations is also vested with the Federal Migration Service of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. 
Besides federal migration policies, local authorities have been introducing regional 
policies. Recent studies suggest that these policies are restrictive in certain regions 
(CMI, G. Vitkovskaya, 2003). According to those studies, in the mid-1990s the most 
restrictive policy has been conducted in regions where the number of labor migrants 
was at a maximum, i.e. Moscow, the Stavropol region, the Rostov region, and the 
Krasnodar region. At the same time, attempts to change the status of labor migrants are 
currently being undertaken in Russia and the regions. In 2006 Russian authorities intend 
to carry out immigration amnesty.  The draft law will be presented to the State Duma in 
the near future. The amnesty will take place in eight regions only and will cover NIS 
citizens without a criminal past. Federal Migration Service estimates that about one 
million migrants will receive amnesty, while Russia will receive revenue from the fees 
on employment authorizations. The fee will be reduced from four to one thousand 
rubles, and the revenue will reach 15 billion rubles. Besides, labor migrants will start 
                                                                                                                                               
foreign labor to Russian Federation and employment of citizens of Russian Federation 
abroad. (From 19 July 2004 RF President’s Decree on Federal Migration Service). 
48 In accordance with President’s Decree from 23 February 2002, No. 232. 
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paying RF taxes.49 Vyacheslav Postavnin, the head of the department overseeing labor 
migration at Russia's Federal Migration Service, told a press conference in Moscow on 
8 November, 2005 that his service is currently carrying out a pilot project in Moscow 
and the Moscow region aimed at legalizing migrants already working illegally in 
Russia. Under current Russian law, such workers face deportation. Apparently, Russia 
will have a very liberal law on immigration in the event the amendments are approved. 
Amnesty implies forgiveness of the absence of required permits on residence and 
employment. All official procedures in this case will last for ten days, whereas at 
present guest-workers wait for their documents for months.  
Is Labor Migration Considered a Value in Armenia?   
As evidenced earlier, Armenia possesses able and active labor force suffers 
considerable unemployment, whereas it so far lacks a working law on the regulation of 
organized labor supply into foreign states. The State Department for Migration of the 
Republic of Armenia has posted a draft law on Organization of Oversees Employment 
which aims at “creating new working places for realization of the right of its citizens to 
work and for the regulation of the ratio of supply and demand in the labor market”, as 
well as “creating favorable conditions for its citizens, targeted at their involvement in 
short-term and mid-term overseas employment”, as well as protect “the rights and 
interests of labor migrants”.50 The draft law, inter alia, envisages state-coordinated 
mechanisms for organization of the labor supply, such as creation of an authorized state 
body for coordinating the organization of overseas employment, procurement of 
overseas labor contracts and entering into bilateral agreements with other countries, 
creation of the State Overseas Labor Assistance Fund, and licensing of overseas 
employment procuring agencies. 
                                                 
49 Translated materials of Regnum.ru and Grani.ru www.regnum.ru/news/541013.html; 
http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.97906.html - both accessed on 11.09.2005, also 
RFE/Russia - http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/11/60e53e58-f84a-4dc2-90c7-
1d5c689eccf9.html – published November 8, 2005 
50 Art. 3 of the draft Law on Organization of Overseas Labor  
www.dmr.am/ADMR/ORENSD~1/ARtagna.htm - accessed on November 29, 2005 
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The draft law targets only certain categories of migrants, i.e. labor migrants. Art. 2 
states that “the law shall not apply to persons traveling abroad for purposes of business, 
education, medical treatment, visiting relatives, … or citizens of the Republic of 
Armenia permanently residing abroad.” Such a limitation is beneficial since it would 
not contribute to expanding the rights of Armenian nationals who choose to 
permanently leave Armenia. Despite positive aspects such as this, the draft law misses 
several critical areas. For example, Art. 4 defines labor migrant as “a citizen of the 
Republic of Armenia residing on its territory, as well as a citizen or a stateless person 
permanently residing in the Republic of Armenia, that shall be employed by a foreign 
employer on the basis of an employment agreement …” The draft law thus does not 
protect migrant workers who have lived and worked in Russia for several years without 
having acquired Russian citizenship or permanent residence status and intending to 
return to Armenia.  
Furthermore, the draft law grants excessive authority to employment agencies, which 
are seen as the main agents providing a labor force to foreign countries. The agencies, 
in particular, are responsible for “monitoring foreign markets, concluding contracts and 
supplying a labor force” (Art. 13, 14, 15). Such undivided authority could create an 
environment favorable to the development of forced labor schemes and human 
trafficking. Besides, the draft law does not provide for cases of overlap in international 
Box 3.1  
The draft law On Overseas Employment was prepared and presented in 2000, but “it was 
met with a negative reaction from other state departments as well as the Parliament.”* Based 
on the provisions of the draft law, the State Department for migration and refugees aimed at 
becoming an agency that would oversee the international labor market, issue licenses to the 
recruitment agencies working in Armenia, and chair a special fund designed as an insurance 
reserve for Armenian labor migrants in need. This draft law was reviewed by an 
international expert in 2001, by the ILO specialists and has been rewritten and submitted for 
the second time. One of the reasons the draft law On Overseas Employment has not yet been 
adopted was the licensing procedure. In order to eliminate a potentially corrupt environment, 
the state administration aims at decreasing licensing procedures altogether. Without 
licensing, however, the DMR feels that there will be considerably less sense in adopting the 
law.  
Another reason for not adopting the draft law On Overseas Employment so far was said to 
be “the general public misunderstanding of the benefits of such a law”.** The perception at 
the time of possible adoption was that the proposed law would encourage emigration from 
Armenia and, therefore, would not be beneficial to the country.  
*  ** From the Interview with Gagik Yeganyan, Head of State Department for migration and 
refugees, December 9, 2004. 
Source: “Overview Of Migration Legislation Of The Republic Of Armenia”, 2004 
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and national legislation in case the intermediary agency is a foreign employer. Finally, 
the presence of an intermediary/employment agency creates a double expense for the 
labor migrant who, in accordance with the draft law, “pays for services provided by the 
agency” (Art. 16) and might also be obliged to pay any additional charges imposed by 
the foreign employer. Moreover, if we recall that the Russian legislation envisages taxes 
and duties on the part of both employers using foreign labor and labor migrants, the 
total expense for the migrant worker could overweigh the risks related to illegal 
employment in Russia.    
Despite certain deficiencies, the mentioned draft law is the only existing legislative 
outline having regulation of labor migration as its goal. Yet, this draft law has not been 
approved by the Armenian Government and numerous labor migrants heading abroad in 
search of economic opportunities technically lack the benefit of state protection. 
Experts say, in the existing conditions, where the mechanisms of state regulation of 
migratory processes are not established, Armenia is not ready to accede to such 
international conventions on labor migration as, for instance, the 1990 UN Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 
since this may introduce additional bureaucratic difficulties in labor migrants’ 
activity.51  In this light, the Armenian government should develop and implement 
mechanisms of information exchange between individuals and business entities covered 
by the law and drafters of this law. The new system should further envisage, inter alia, 
cooperation between governmental agencies and private entrepreneurs sponsoring and 
organizing trips for labor migrants. Moreover, the state should ensure the protection of 
labor migrants’ basic rights in the host country. Migrants’ rights should be guaranteed 
by the national legislation and bilateral agreements with the host country. Finally, a 
consideration, explored in more detail in the final chapter of this study, of the capacity 
and involvement of the Armenian Diaspora in the process is a must in the Armenian 
context. 
Existing International Agreements on Labor Migration Between Armenia and 
Russia as a Base for Elaboration of Future Policies 
A number of CIS countries and other nations of Eastern Europe and Central Asia have 
pursued bilateral agreements on migration and agreements on social protection and 
humane policies for return and readmission of their nationals. Kyrgyzstan’s migration 
                                                 
51 Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, E. Tjurjukanova, UNESCO Report, 2004 
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strategy for 2004 included a call for regional inputs to the development of a retirement 
insurance scheme for labor migrants, channeling labor migration remittances through a 
regional mechanism, and recommendations for facilitating the World Trade 
Organization’s General Agreement on Trade and Services (Mode 4) as an instrument to 
regulate labor migration at the regional level.52 The CIS countries that are unwillingly 
facing the problem of mutual migration realize that a better legal control of overseas 
employment can benefit the home and host countries as well as prevent many issues 
entailed by illegal migration not discussed in this paper. 
Certain steps on cooperation in the area of legal migration as part of the economic 
reintegration of the former Soviet Republics can be observed in the Treaty on Creation 
of an Economic Union, reached on September 24, 1993.  The CIS Member States 
“agreed to create the necessary legal, economic and organizational conditions for free 
movement of capital and workers, conditions for fair competition … [they] pledged to 
refrain from any unilateral non-economic actions restricting access to their markets 
without mutual agreement” (Art. 7-9). The parties worked out a plan-program on 
“preparation of the drafts of the CIS intergovernmental agreements … most important 
are multilateral agreements on the CIS Free Trade Area, … labor migration and social 
security of working migrants.” Articles 19-24 of Chapter V (“Social Policy” I.L.M. 
Page 1307) provide for “visa-free movement, coordination of labor relation policies, 
antidiscrimination, recognition of educational certificates, international norms of safety 
for labor, mutual obligations concerning social insurance, pensions” and similar 
issues.53 In other words, the contracting parties agreed to conclude social agreements 
providing for the migration of work force and mutual obligations in the matters of 
social security, pension provisions and other issues requiring a similar agreement 
between the member-states of the Economic Union. This Treaty thus provides a 
commonly recognized basis for new initiatives in the area of economic cooperation 
between the CIS countries, including a potential agreement on temporary migrant 
contracts between Armenia and Russia.  
In a follow-up to the above-mentioned Economic Treaty, the CIS countries entered into 
the Agreement on Cooperation on Labor Migration and Social Protection of Migrant 
Workers in 1994. The agreement became effective for Armenia in February of 1996.  
                                                 
52 IOM, “World Migration”, 2005 
53 American Society of International Law, International Legal Materials (I.L.M.), Vol. 
34, No. 5, Washington, D.C., 1995 
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This document provides for a series of mutual commitments in the filed of labor 
migration, specifically relating to the social protection of the parties’ labor migrants in 
other CIS countries. In particular, it envisages (1) mutual recognition of diplomas, 
qualifications, certificates, titles, and degrees, as well as mutual recognition of work 
experience records; (2) migrant’s workers eligibility for social benefits, insurance and 
medical treatment provisions under the host countries’ legislation; (3) equal treatment 
of migrant workers under the host countries’ national legislation;  (4) prohibition of 
double-taxation.  
Furthermore, the Republic of Armenia is party to the Agreement on Cooperation 
between CIS Countries against Illegal Migration, which came into force on March 6, 
1998. The agreement outlines the parties’ commitments to information exchange and 
maintenance of a registry and database of illegal migrants, approximation of 
legislations, cooperation between respective enforcement agencies, etc. The agreement 
defers to national legislation to govern cases of deportation of illegal migrants. This 
document is more or less comprehensive but does not address the rights of migrant 
workers deprived of their legal status after arriving into the host country.  Another 
important arrangement, lessons of which could serve as basis for further agreements, is 
the Agreement on Regulation of Voluntary Re-Settlement between the Government of 
Armenia and the Russian Federation, entered into force on March 4, 1999, provides for 
reciprocal commitments by parties in assisting voluntary re-settlement of migrants. The 
agreement provides guarantees on property rights and social protection of re-settlers. 
The document is of declarative nature and does not provide practical mechanisms for 
assisting migrants returning to the home country.   
Main Findings 
Specifics of the existing mechanisms for receiving foreign labor migrants in the Russian 
Federation should be taken into consideration while determining labor migration 
policies in Armenia.  Russia will continue to accept foreign workers, and Armenian 
migrant workers in particular, as long as there is a need for productive resources.  
Currently, Russia’s economy is growing54, however, the country is experiencing a 
deficit in labor force. The latter is evidenced by the fact that Russia has increased the 
quota on the number of invitations for labor workers by almost a third as compared to 
                                                 
54 World Bank Country Brief, 2004. 
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last year, from 214 thousand in 2005 to 330 thousand in 20055. On their part, if the 
current trend persists, Armenian migrants will continue to go to Russia as long as 
relatively easy access to the country remains and as long as migrants retain hopes of 
finding employment in Russia. Current immigration policies in Russia lead to the 
increasing vulnerability of migrants and curb potential economic gains for both the 
home and host countries. These policies involuntarily entail marginalization of migrant 
workers and are thus counter-productive due to the fact that they create and 
environment favorable to illegal residence and employment of migrants.  
The review of bilateral and international legislation reveals gaps in the existing 
migration policies related to the exchange of temporary labor between Armenia and 
Russia. Protection of migrants’ rights and guaranteeing their legal status in Russia or 
elsewhere should be among the governing principles for any future national or bilateral 
legislation on labor migration adopted by Armenia. The quantity of quotas on 
temporary residence for the last several years (since the adoption of Federal Law 2002) 
was not and is not sufficient to provide for a legal status of Armenian labor migrants in 
Russia. In this instance, monitoring and forecasting the expected limit on the size of the 
quota to be issued by Russian authorities should be carried out before approving the 
number of contracts to be issued to Armenian labor migrants by the Armenian 
government. Also, geographic considerations would help to determine particularities of 
Armenian migration policy, i.e. which regions of the Russian Federation should be 
targeted to provide for both better economic gains and ensure legitimacy of Armenian 
workers (Table 3.2).56  
                                                 
55 Data provided by the Government of Russian Federation 
http://www.government.gov.ru/government/index.html?he_id=38 – accessed on 
December 1, 2005. 
56 See an exemplary distribution of quotas by regions in the Russian Federation in Table 
3.2.  
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Chapter 4. Macroeconomic Considerations of Armenian Labor Migration 
The magnitude of the migration process, as mentioned above, leads to a logical inquiry 
of potential implications of large-scale migration on Armenia’s economy and what, if 
anything, can and should be done in terms of instituting certain controls over the 
process. In this section we address the first part of the main question, i.e. economic 
impact. Because of its character permanent migration57 is excluded from the current 
analysis. The focus is thus on potential effects of the regulated temporary labor 
migration process, sponsored and supported at the government level. 
Temporary labor migration, in its extended definition, includes seasonal migration as 
well.58 Furthermore, as has been shown in Chapter 2, in the Armenian case, temporary 
labor migration is mainly caused by economic reasons as opposed to political or social 
concerns. The reasoning behind this is that any migration caused by the latter will most 
likely result in a permanent move to another country rather than being temporary in 
nature. 
We assume two main inputs in the economy: labor and capital. Does the current 
migration trend have any effect on Armenia’s labor market? What is the wage response 
to the labor migration phenomenon and what is the role of remittances and funds 
brought back by migrants into the Armenian economy? Although the range of 
macroeconomic considerations can be more extensive with a discussion of the possible 
impacts of labor migration on prices of goods and services in the home economy, 
                                                 
57 It is convenient to differentiate between different types of migration by reference to 
the number of years the migrant has spent outside the country. Here, we assume 
permanent migration to be a non-returning exit of migrants from Armenia, except for 
occasional short-term visits to the homeland in rare cases. According to the studies of 
migration mentioned above permanent migration is more likely to have a stronger effect 
on host rather than home country.  
58 Depending on what perspective [i.e. host or home country] one looks from, 
temporary migration, in fact, can be a type of permanent migration. This happens in 
cases when migrants leave their home countries to never come back but travel from one 
host country to another during their work career. In this case, the migrant is considered 
to have moved permanently outside the home country, but is still regarded temporary in 
relation to adopted host countries. In addition, a collective term of “returning 
migration” is sometimes referred to combine pure temporary migrants and those who 
had moved from their home country intending to stay abroad but later decided to return. 
This paper focuses, primarily, on purely temporary migrants in relation to their home 
country. In other words, we look at labor migrants exiting Armenia temporarily and 
always returning after their assignment or contract abroad is fulfilled.  
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effects on housing and capital expenditure, exchange rate and interest rate fluctuations 
as a result of large financial inflows of foreign exchange, within the scope of this paper 
only the three categories59 mentioned above are addressed. These represent the primary 
and core aspects that shape the analytical framework of labor migration patterns in 
Armenian economics.  
Despite recent success in achieving positive trends in macroeconomic indicators as 
posted by the IMF, (2005) [10.1% real GDP growth in 2004, with projected 2005 rate at 
8%; and inflation down to 2% in 200460] Armenia still faces some major problems 
affecting its economy, including, but by no means limited to, the wide spread poverty 
and unemployment. A strong body of economic research and policy analysis advocates 
increased levels of investment and savings as the primary means of sustaining the levels 
and distribution of the positive effects of economic growth in the Armenian economy. 
The Armenian Diaspora is assigned a pivotal role as “first movers”61 in spearheading 
the process and taking up the initiative of investing in the risky business environment, 
raising the country’s competitiveness and attractiveness for the larger capital. Still the 
situation raises concerns.  As recent as 2002, 50% of the Armenian population lived 
below the poverty line.62 Furthermore, the same source claims that 30% of Armenia’s 
total available labor force was unemployed in 2003.63 Interestingly, this last finding 
stands in sharp contrast with the International Financial Statistics (2005) estimate of 
14.2% (Chart 4.1). Although, it is safe to suggest that truth lies somewhere between the 
two estimates, the current situation in the labor market does become troublesome as one 
considers all factors that come into play when one examines the development prospects 
of a small landlocked and resource poor country such as Armenia. 
 
                                                 
59 In other words, we look at the labor market; wage response; remittances/capital 
formation in this section. 
60 Table 4.1 in Appendix for a summary of recent macro indicators as presented by the 
IMF (2005). 
61 Freinkman (2001) 
62 CIA World Factbook (2005) 
63 i.e., all who have the capacity to work and once have worked. 
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Labor Market 
There is a strong [and apparent] connection between the economic development and 
labor market. A theorist might consider a quick affirmative answer interpreting a 
reduction in population [i.e. labor force] as a reduction to the labor market supply. 
Further, one might continue that thought claiming that a reduced labor supply has a 
detrimental effect on the economy, as output falls throwing the economy into dire 
straits. 
This might hold true in the case of a theoretical model of an economy that operates at 
close to s full employment level, that is, at an unemployment rate that is equal to the 
natural rate of unemployment64. However, we strongly doubt the same one-stop 
reasoning could be applied in the case of Armenia and the unemployment rates cited 
above only confirm our suspicions. Indeed, human capital is Armenia’s major resource 
as is recognized in practically every study on the subject. Yet, how is one to treat the 
unemployed segment of the economy?  
Lucas (2005) argues that emigration does not necessarily result in a proportionate 
decrease in the labor force of the home country. Not everyone leaving the country is in 
the labor force prior to the exit, even though it is difficult to determine that with 
certainty a priori. In fact, as we have already seen in the Armenian case, a large 
proportion of migrants are either unemployed [by choice or circumstances, and as such 
could be considered outside of Armenia’s workforce] or family members [majority non-
working while in Armenia] reuniting with the migrants living abroad. 
A reduction in potential labor supply has an ambiguous effect on the economy. On one 
level, as another person leaves the country those in the workforce who remain and are 
still unemployed gain a higher chance of finding a job as competition naturally 
decreases. A large proportion of migrants often comes from the same geographical 
areas, freeing up the space for those in neighboring regions to settle in their place, and 
quite opposite to the above, those who decide to stay in the home country might choose 
not to participate in the labor market at all satisfied with the financial help provided by 
their relatives, in the form of remittances, from abroad. 
 
                                                 
64 In other words, “the economic condition when everyone who wishes to work at the 
going wage rate for their type of labor is employed” wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn 
– accessed December 6, 2005. 
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The above seems to work in areas of Armenia with a high density of well-trained and 
educated professionals, especially in recent years as students have continually been 
returning from abroad and finding themselves at odds with either seeking jobs outside 
the country or waiting on opportunities at home. Moreover, there can be an interplay 
between internal and international migration. As argued earlier some people decide to 
migrate not until after previous migrants from the same region have established a social 
network in the host country. The Armenian case presented along these lines would refer 
to the increasing proportion of new settlers in Yerevan and other towns across the 
country, as they get increasing financial backing from their relatives abroad in form of 
remittances.  
Aside from the direct quantitative effects on the labor market, what also matters is the 
relative composition of the quality of labor that is exiting the country. Here again, one 
must be cautious in making any quick conclusions. The studies analyzed in Chapter 2 of 
this paper indicate that highly skilled labor tends to [permanently] migrate from 
Armenia to developed countries within the European Union and the United States. At 
the same time temporary rural migrants with comparatively lower skill sets move to the 
countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), predominantly Russia, for a wide range of 
reasons. This has proven to be a highly important aspect of temporary migration for the 
Philippines.  
As the Philippine government improved it ability to streamline flows of temporary labor 
and as skill requirements in the receiving countries became more sophisticated, 
Filipinos willing to migrate were obliged to seek higher levels of education and 
adequate training to stay competitive and meet the qualitative changes in the 
international demand for labor.65 That in turn resulted in the transformation of the 
Philippines’ educational system and country’s technological preparedness, with 
continuously advancing levels of instruction and research at the universities. Temporary 
migration was encouraged. It was assumed to bear a temporary cost, with a potential 
permanent achievement for the developing economy. As Allburo and Abella (2002) 
argue, there are certain “social gains as these workers acquire additional skills, are 
exposed to new productivity tools, and appreciate broader perspectives.”66 This brings 
an issue into a different perspective. Namely, labor force management is no longer a 
                                                 
65 Alburo and Abella (2002) 
66 Ibid., p.4 
 33
matter of numbers, but a matter of numbers times efficiency, improvement and new 
skill.  
Another study67, addressing high-skilled temporary migration from India, has found 
evidence for a strong labor supply response to raised skill requirements abroad as 
workers acquired the necessary qualifications and entered the high-skill sectors in the 
Indian economy replacing those who had migrated permanently and complementing 
those involved in temporary migration. As a result of the instances cited above, the 
Indian and Philippine labor force has seen growing international competitiveness and 
consequently relative economic advances in both countries through greater investment 
opportunities and the prospect of sustainable growth as the labor force has persistently 
improved.68 
Applied to the issue at hand and based solely on the migration data and patterns 
discussed in Chapter 2, it is reasonable to expect employers in Russia to raise their 
expectations of temporary migrants flowing in from the CIS countries, and Armenia in 
particular. Further, assuming that Russia retains its status as the most popular 
destination of temporary Armenian labor, it is safe to suggest that skilled professionals 
from Armenia would become interested in taking job opportunities in the Russian 
market. With a provision for a regulated temporary migration scheme in Armenia, this 
may contribute to placing additional pressure on migrants to acquire additional skills 
and training prior to their departure.69 The experience of other countries is similar to 
Armenia’s situation, as briefly sketched above, such development will most likely be a 
positive outcome for a country faced with presently unregulated emigration. 
                                                 
67 Commander et al, (2004) 
68 See for example Box 1.2 in Chapter 1. The main finding is that despite the exodus of 
highly skilled labor from the Indian economy, the firms were able to re-gain 
temporarily lost human capital by hiring new specialists in the same field. In addition, 
the economy as a whole benefited, as the migrants, who have gained new professional 
experience and earned some capital, invested in the development of the software sector 
in India. 
69 We are intentionally running ahead of our discussion to highlight the point that it is 
possible to find gains in raising the quality of labor force of the home country indirectly 
by means of regulated temporary migrations. A formal presentation of possible 
temporary migration regime for Armenia will be addressed in the concluding chapter of 
this study. 
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Wage Considerations? 
Would a discussion related to labor issues benefit from an attempt to draw any insights 
about the role of wages in the migration process? More importantly, one could ask what 
happens to the real wage as more people participate in the temporary labor migration 
process. 
In the theoretically perfect world, a reduction in the supply of labor (either in aggregate 
terms or within a particular profession or locale) creates a natural labor shortage and 
induces expectations of rising wages across the board or in a particular segment of the 
economy (Lucas, 2005). Unfortunately, such a simplified view does not seem to apply 
well to the reality of the Armenian economy. As has been stated earlier, a big 
proportion of people involved in labor migration process are unemployed/working age70 
individuals. A quick, intuitive, conclusion is that there should be little to no pressure on 
wages as individuals outside the workforce migrate, whether temporarily or 
permanently. In fact their migration is in part caused by the wage differentials between 
Armenia and Russia, as was the case during the Soviet period.71 
Dustmann (2001) using German macroeconomic data develops the wage differentials 
view further in studying its effects on the duration of stay for guest workers abroad. 
According to his analysis growing wage differentials between host and home countries, 
with host wages higher and home lower, increases the optimal duration of stay of an 
average migrant, but an increase in host country wage has an ambiguous impact, in 
effect reducing the time period spent by the temporary worker in the receiving country. 
Citing evidence for such a counterintuitive effect in Germany, Dustmann explains the 
phenomenon as income effect. In other words, as wages rise in the host country, 
marginal value for a typical labor migrant to stay rises as well. However, rising wages, 
and the subsequent rise in the cost of living in the host country, decreases the marginal 
utility of wealth or real income of the migrant. Hence, the conclusion is that labor 
migrants would return to their home country earlier than it would have been otherwise. 
At the same time, it is speculative to suggest that the mere inactivity of labor migrants 
in the Armenian labor force, while they are inside the country, has a downward pressure 
on the real wage at home. The apparent reasoning behind such a proposition is that 
when there is a large supply of labor (even though not all of it is part of the active 
                                                 
70 However, actively seeking work. 
71 Yeganyan and Shahnazaryan (2004) 
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workforce, i.e. high unemployment) employers in Armenia will keep wages at low 
levels assured that for any discontented employee there will readily be another one to 
quickly replace him or her at the same low wage rate. Labor market competition would 
shape any pressures on current and future wages. 
Another aspect in relation to wage must be considered. The approach sketched in the 
preceding section introducing some labor market issues suggests that as the labor 
migration process becomes increasingly regulated, more temporary workers would 
return with improved skill-sets to Armenia, as a result of economic development in the 
host country, raising employers’ expectations for guest workers and competition among 
the temporary migrants in the host country for better jobs72 triggering technological and 
educational changes in the country. The Experience of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the 
Philippines and other countries shows that with the appearance of competitive, better 
trained, and educated labor force able to create jobs at home, real wages closely 
followed the trends in regulated temporary labor migration.73 Pakistan, with a high 
proportion of temporary migrants working in construction, has witnessed a growth in 
real wages in its construction sector, followed by a wage increase for unskilled 
agricultural labor. For the Philippines the wage rise happened mostly in the 
manufacturing sector, with a smaller spillover to the agricultural sector, primarily due to 
the fact that recruitment for labor migration programs in that sector is not as big in 
percentage terms as in Pakistan. Lucas (2005) notes, that home country labor market 
gains are apparent: through upward pressure on wages in at least one sector and 
resulting spillover effects across economy’s other sectors; and/or substitution of the 
émigrés with unemployed (or underemployed) individuals in the labor force who have 
decided to stay, even though it is temporary in nature. 
An efficient temporary labor migration regime implies an active role of the fiscal 
authority in streamlining and regulating labor migration processes. A proposed structure 
for the Armenian case is discussed in the next chapter below. In order for Armenia to 
draw gains from the temporary labor migration process,74 besides implementing a well-
                                                 
72 Illustrative tables on current migration trends to Russia are presented in the Appendix 
below. 
73 See Lucas (2005) for a concise summary and discussion. 
74 Undoubtedly, there are costs to migration, with the most apparent being a loss of 
human capital. Stahl and Habib (1991) note that labor emigration could have 
detrimental effects on unemployment rate and productivity, as it gets too difficult to 
replace the workers exiting the economy. It is this realization that prompts us to suggest 
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grounded temporary labor migration structure, it is crucial to establish sound controls 
for data management to draw relevant policy implications. 
Remittances and Idea of the Pan-Armenian Bank 
In our discussion of economic concerns of temporary labor migration we cannot bypass 
the topic of remittances and the effects that monetary transfers from abroad have on 
Armenia’s economy. Often being the primary source for financing micro capital 
projects, e.g., individuals in the home country setting up businesses using the funds 
received from relatives from abroad, remittances inflows are gaining popularity in 
discussions of growth and development in less developed countries. The role of 
remittances has become a highly debated subject in recent literature.75 A recent strand 
of literature places direct correlation between growth sustainability and remittances in 
the developing world. For a growing number of countries, remittances have offered a 
crucial source of financing their balance of payments, in certain cases, as noted by 
Ratha (2003) exceeding total foreign direct investment flows.  
Chami et al (2003) in their analysis of remittances data on 113 countries over the span 
of 29 years come to a less optimistic conclusion. In their model of the effects of 
remittances on economic growth the researchers find the factor of moral hazard, due to 
the fact that transfers take place under the conditions of asymmetric information and 
economic uncertainty, have a negative influence on economic growth. In fact, they state 
that remittances “do not appear to be a significant source of capital for economic 
development.”76 
In Armenia, a fresh estimate of total remittance flows into the country has produced a 
figure of approximately $1 billion77 for 2003 that number continues to grow.78 For a 
                                                                                                                                               
that in face of apparent migration; a controlled labor migration process could dampen 
the loss of human capital and in time turnout to bring more gains to the economy than 
losses. 
75 See, for example, Chami et al (2003), Ratha (2003), Lucas (2005), Roberts and 
Banaian (2005), etc. 
76 Chami et al (2003), p.21. 
77 Roberts and Banaian, 2005. 
78 Armenialiberty.org (2005) referring to the information from the Central Bank of 
Armenia reported 40% increase in total transfers abroad for the first three months of 
2005 as compared to the same time frame in 2004. The news service offers informative 
reports and brief overview of recent exchange rate fluctuations in Armenia. 
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country with an official GDP of close to $4 billion,79 such significant financial inflows 
can have profound impacts on the economy’s core aspects and its structure. Roberts and 
Banaian (2005) cite little evidence of remittances being channeled into formal financial 
sectors in Armenia. However, a curious finding that indirectly supports the earlier 
discussion is the negative impact on labor supply and positive impact on education.80 
The latter is an encouraging factor that professional growth remains high on the agenda 
in Armenia. Furthermore, the same study draws attention to the fact that, in the case of 
Armenia, it is not just remittances that matter, but also the capital and skill that 
returning migrants eventually bring back. The authors provide astute comments and 
offer practical recommendations on certain policy tools that can help the Armenian 
government draw benefits from the growing remittances flows and directing those 
inflows into growth inducing activity at home. Among other considerations the 
economists stress a regulated migration process and strict accounting of migratory 
patterns along the lines of the International Labor Organization, formal Diaspora 
participation in the funds transfer and management via Business Mentoring Programs / 
SME Development initiatives and, as described originally in Gevorkyan and Grigorian 
(2003), Pan-Armenian Development Bank.  
The last consideration can be adopted in our analysis. Within the framework of a 
controlled labor migration regime, discussed below, the Bank would provide an 
institutionalized mode for currently large and unorganized remittance flows into 
Armenia. The original rationale for introducing the idea of a Pan-Armenian Bank was 
to attract risk-averse small investors from the Diaspora allowing the Bank to eventually 
undertake certain development projects in agriculture, education and other sectors.81 In 
the current situation the argument could be extended further. The Bank can effectively 
serve as a financial intermediary for Armenian nationals abroad, with open accounts at 
the Bank, to transfer money home via formal channels. Moreover, guaranteeing a 
certain rate of return for account holders, the Bank can direct the accumulated funds to 
competitive SME investment projects in Armenia or provide funds to migrant workers’ 
families on demand from their savings accounts. Again, we add a caveat that such 
systems seem to be feasible given the current temporary labor migration regime in place 
in Armenia. 
                                                 
79 Both IFS (2005) and IMF (2005) estimates converge around the same estimate. 
80 Roberts and Banaian, 2005. 
81 See Gevorkyan and Grigorian (2003) 
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In his extensive study of various temporary labor migration regimes Lucas (2005) cites 
evidence from a wide sample of countries proving that remittances do not have clear-
cut positive implications for economic growth. There seems to be enough ground for 
both sides of the argument to hold and a lot depends on the migration programs 
implemented by the governments as well as Diaspora involvement in the migration 
process. A number of countries post high proportions of remittances to GDP and 
encourage their citizens to send money back to sustain their families at home [e.g. the 
Philippines]. In simple economic terms, a relatively large inflow of foreign exchange 
could have upward pressure on exchange rates inhibiting export activity and, by 
extension, restricting job creation in the export sectors. This becomes of particular 
concern for Armenia with its embryonic state of export industries and abrupt changes in 
exchange rate.82  
This leads to a conclusion that extensive reliance on remittances as the source of growth 
might prove to be detrimental as it exposes the country to external capital shocks. 
Another side effect of such reliance is the postponement of structural reforms in the 
economy. Skeptical of the growth implications, Cobbe (1994) in his review of 
economic migration in South Africa and Lesotho, focuses on opportunity cost to the 
home country being the net loss of labor force that could have been employed and the 
value created at home, given a more active participation of fiscal authority.  
Naturally, remittances will only work as long as there are people inside the home 
country with whom the migrants have certain connections. If there is one aspect in 
which all studies cited above agree upon it is that remittances have a positive 
correlation with expenditure geared towards improvement of home human capital, i.e. 
education, health, housing, etc. It is this finding that Armenia should and can capitalize 
on, as the human capital remains to be Armenia’s main resource for prosperity. It is yet 
to be fully determined how exactly remittances influence growth. Some factors that 
shape that are, but not limited to, the existence of an active workforce inside the 
country, channels of transfer (efficient financial intermediaries), clear understanding of 
the multiplier effect of remittances on consumption and private investment,83 and 
                                                 
82 Indeed, in the third quarter of 2004 the Central Bank of Armenia adapted a new 
policy tool – making large scale purchases of foreign exchange on the inter-bank 
market – in order to mitigate currency pressures resulting from unexpected [and large in 
magnitude] changes in monetary transfers to Armenia from abroad, according to the 
CBA’s 2004 Annual Report, CBA (2004). 
83 Sorensen, 2004 
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effective reallocation of incoming financial resources in the Armenian economy, e.g. by 
way of microfinance or state sponsored development programs that distribute funds to 
the families on demand, while channeling the unused portion to infrastructure projects 
and structural investment.84  
The triad (labor, wage, remittances) framework approach is proposed for the analysis of 
the impacts of temporary labor migration processes outside Armenia on the country’s 
economy. Remittances are transient in nature, and are more likely to come from 
temporary migrants rather than permanent. At the same time, labor market and wage 
effects in the absence of a regulated temporary labor migration policy remain 
ambiguous and prone to instability. A regulated approach to the issue is more likely to 
produce positive impacts with higher stability in the labor market, advanced growth of 
human capital, possible increases in real wages at home and decreases in wage disparity 
between home and host economies. In addition, remittance in the regulated labor 
migration environment can be channeled via official vehicles, such as the Pan-
Armenian Bank, to the recipients’ families and fund infrastructure investment projects. 
Economic theory and the experience of countries involved in temporary migration 
regimes proves that the above-cited results are achievable. Moreover, given recent 
migration trends and growing social discontent with infrastructure and economic 
reforms in Armenia, implementation of the temporary labor migration scheme that 
ensures rotation of Armenian guest workers abroad needs to be considered. In the 
following section we discuss our vision for such a regime based on the existing 
international experience applied within the Armenian context. 
To reiterate, this study does not intend to provide a direct answer to the question of the 
causes of outward mass [labor] migration from Armenia in the years after the country’s 
independence in 1991, nor does this paper preoccupies itself with fine-tuning the 
statistical estimates regarding the number of people leaving or returning to the country.  
The fact of persistent mass migration out of Armenia, whether permanent or temporary 
in nature, must be accepted and dealt with. It is urgent and crucial for both the 
Armenian government, the civic groups in Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora in 
Russia and elsewhere to take appropriate measures to understand the potential effects of 
such migration on the country’s economy and society and to develop relevant policy 
procedures addressing the issue. 
                                                 
84 In line with the ideas mentioned earlier in the paper in the discussion of the Pan-
Armenian Bank. 
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Chapter 5. Temporary Labor Migration Regime in Armenia: Concept Overview 
The right to emigrate is as basic as the right to private property and free speech. Equally 
so is the right to seek employment opportunities outside one’s native land. Broadly 
speaking, the issue seems to arise when balancing the host country’s immigration 
practice, as advanced countries continuously create barriers for entry in their societies 
for new immigrants, and the home country’s economic development. As we have seen 
in Chapter 2, Armenia has been experiencing continuous net migration drain on its 
skilled and unskilled labor force.  
A large proportion of migrants exit Armenia temporarily to perform random jobs in the 
Russian market. Due to inconsistencies in legal regulation, discussed in Chapter 3, and 
other issues many of them often work as undocumented illegal migrants, hence, 
jeopardizing their potential earnings and, in effect, opportunity for readmission to the 
country and regaining their ability to provide income to the migrants’ families back in 
Armenia in form of remittances or repatriated capital. Thus, the element of return is 
pivotal in the discussion of labor migration trends in the post-Soviet, and Armenian 
context, in particular. Yeghizaryan et al (2003) focused attention on the urgent need for 
a new immigration policy in their study, citing its economic benefits for Armenia. Yet 
one should bear in mind the delicacy of the issue. An approach geared to the specifics 
of the Armenian reality is needed. A blank application taken from the experience that 
might be reasonable elsewhere can produce counter-productive results. Any major 
imbalance would lead to a situation where “there is nothing more permanent than 
temporary migration.”85 Embarking on devising an efficient temporary migration 
regime for Armenia is not an easy task, and one prone with initial oversights. The 
scheme presented below, as such, will require further improvement as well as sufficient 
testing. Nevertheless, it can be taken as a reasonable starting point.  
The current official vision of the migration policy concept of the Armenian government 
has been discussed in Chapter 3 of this study. It is an encouraging development with 
potentially profound implications for the Armenian economy and society. With that in 
mind we attempt to further expand the idea and present our vision of the model that 
would encompass an important participant of the temporary labor migration process, i.e. 
the Armenian Diaspora. We first turn to theoretical introductions of the known labor 
migration policy regimes. 
                                                 
85 Martin (2003) 
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Policy Regime 
Literature on temporary migration assumes operation of the particular migration regime 
provides a basic formal and analytical framework for process management. Adopting 
classifications from Abella (1997) one can distinguish among the following policy 
regimes: 
• Laissez-faire: Under this regime decisions to [e]migrate, job search and 
contract terms are left to the market by the state. Such a regime is more 
characteristic of high-income countries (e.g. Portugal). 
• Regulated: A situation where the government is responsible for introducing 
laws and regulations governing the recruitment process. However, 
authorized private agencies are the main [only] intermediary between the 
employers and employee (e.g. India). 
• State-managed: The government is actively involved in planning and 
promoting by setting up state run organizations that recruit and place 
workers abroad. Often times, under this scheme, the state negotiates with 
foreign governments on equal treatment of employees and protection of their 
rights, and enforcing minimum work standards (e.g. the Philippines) 
• State monopoly: The government assumes full responsibility for running 
the process of labor migration, including the recruitment and deployment of 
temporary workers, which is done by public/private agencies under the 
State-managed regime (e.g. Viet Nam). 
Based on the analysis of the Armenian reality, history and current polity, in addition to 
the complex understanding of the labor migration processes and economic 
considerations sketched schematically in the preceding chapters we propose that the 
best scenario for Armenia would be a state-managed labor migration regime.  
Three main principles86 often guide the discussion of instituting a new migration 
system: 
• Government policies – considerations of any restrictions on migration, 
protection policies of temporary migrants abroad, how return policy is enforced. 
                                                 
86 Adopted from Martin (2003) 
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To regulate the migration process the Armenian government will require 
cooperation of the Diaspora groups and existing networks (pockets of the 
Armenian communities in Russia and other countries) in order to sustain the 
effective implementation of the new regime. Experience of other countries that 
are net-senders of labor force, e.g. Mexico,87 shows that the existence of a 
network in the receiving country often predetermines the pattern and direction 
of labor migration. A network-based approach developed in cooperation 
between Armenian government and Diaspora groups in Russia. A similar 
framework could be applied to other countries with lower density of temporary 
Armenian migrants, but strong formal presence of the “old” Diaspora. This is 
necessary in reducing any instances of illegal migration or involvement of 
migrants in illegal activities, as was discussed in Chapter 3. 
• Existence of economic benefits for labor migrants resulting from migration. 
Even though their preferences might be different, naturally, people would not be 
attempting to travel abroad for work if it were not in their self-interest of earning 
income to support their families. We have addressed some of the related issues 
in the earlier chapters. For the purposes of current discussion, it is suffice to 
assume that migrants do gain from regulated migration processes. The gains 
from migration, in terms of acquired skills, capital and remittances that help 
finance education or funding of small investment projects also spill over to 
migrants’ families and are considered to outweigh any potential costs resulting 
from the temporary absence from home. 
• Legal considerations – under the state managed regime, a solid legal basis for 
temporary labor migration is a requirement. As Chapter 3 highlighted, 
agreements between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation are 
still rudimentary and largely ineffective. Further, separate treaties can be 
developed with local administrations of Russia’s regions, especially in those 
with high concentration of the “old” and “new” Armenian Diaspora.88  
                                                 
87 For an overview of Diaspora network influence in attracting labor migrants in the 
case of Mexico and the USA, see Richter et al 2005. 
88 According to the estimates on the Armenia Diaspora Conference, Russian Armenian 
Diaspora accounts to two million people 
http://www.armeniaDiaspora.com/followup/population.html - accessed December 2, 
2005 
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First Steps 
The first step during the actual implementation of such a large-scale project would 
require the establishment of trustworthy relationships across three main players; the 
Armenian and Russian official governmental structures and the Armenian Diaspora in 
Russia. Geographically, the Armenian communities in Russia are widespread across 
almost all regions. Historically, the main pockets of Armenian Diaspora have large 
concentrations in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the South Caucasus (Rostov-na-Donu 
and Krasnodar). The Armenians who settled there prior to the breakup of the USSR 
form the main part of these communities. Elsewhere, it has been noted that these groups 
represent most active and viable elements in the Armenian Diaspora in Russia, spread 
across various spheres of Russian academia, business, military and civil service.89 A 
characteristic feature of the Russian Armenian Diaspora is the nature of its self-
organization, which is strikingly different from the self-organization of the Armenian 
Diaspora in the West, or for that matter, outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. 
Unlike political affiliations of the Armenian Diaspora elsewhere, geography plays an 
important role in the spread of activity of the Russian Armenian Diaspora. Networks of 
recent Armenian migrants, discussed in Chapter 2, clustered around industrial and 
administrative centers in Russia, contribute to the specifics of the Armenian Diaspora 
there. That allows us to refer to the Armenian Diaspora in Russia in terms of a 
community. Community groups managed by individuals from the “old” Diaspora are 
seen as the “official” representation of the Russian-Armenian society by the regional, 
municipal and federal administrations in Russia. It is assumed, even though the two 
types of Diaspora are very different in terms of the background and mentality, that the 
old Diaspora has some type of responsibility, or control over arriving immigrants.90  
In this paper we adopt a similar view, however, with caution. The caution is due to the 
fact that the old Armenian Diaspora, still undergoing institutionalization, cannot be held 
fully responsible for the activities of their compatriots coming to Russia from Armenia, 
whether to settle or to assume temporary work. For the successful interplay of the two, 
the old Diaspora, that until recently did not consider itself to be a Diaspora at all as 
everyone was part of the USSR, needs to receive cooperation at other levels of the 
                                                 
89 See, for example, Oussatcheva (2002) 
90 See the analysis of the historical and current trends in the Russian Armenian Diaspora 
in Oussatcheva (2002) and Lourie (1999). 
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Armenian polity, primarily in dealings with the government and civic groups in 
Armenia. 
In terms of instituting a working temporary labor migration regime, the above presents 
a necessary requirement for the below proposed scheme to work. Namely, any 
temporary labor migration regime that might be put in place for it to hold legitimacy 
and be efficient must provide legal status to the migrants, yield gains to the Armenian 
economy and the Russian economy and require a healthy and strong cooperation 
between the Armenian Diaspora in Russia and the officialdoms of Armenia and Russia. 
The Russian Armenian Diaspora through its established and growing communities can 
play an intermediary role in the migration process between the Republic of Armenia 
and the Russian government either locally, within any specific region or on a 
countrywide scale. In addition, and mainly due to the acknowledged fact of its profound 
penetration in business and education, the Diaspora community plays an important role 
in our model of temporary labor migration by contracting with potential employers and 
keeping the communication lines open between all participants as described in the next 
section below. 
The Model 
The model that, in our view, supports the operations of the temporary labor migration 
regime between Armenia and Russia is presented in Figure 5.1 below.  It provides an 
image of the migration process and determines the primary participants. An important 
feature of the chart is that it stipulates mutual relationships among all participants 
(double lines). By definition, a similar approach could be applied to cases with large 
established Armenian Diaspora communities and a high proportion of recent migrants 
from Armenia. This model assumes the existence of bilateral treaties between the 
Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation regulating the flow of temporary labor 
migrants between the two countries. The treaties include provisions guaranteeing the 
legal status of the migrants, protection of their basic rights and the responsibilities of 
each side.91 Aside from the official bilateral treaties between the two governments, to 
warranty better treatment of its citizens and encompass possible alternative ways of 
employing temporary labor in the Russian regions, it will be prudent for the Armenian 
                                                 
91 An example of such responsibilities could include provisions on repatriation and fair 
treatment of the migrants by the authorities. Responsibility would fall on the Russian 
side in the latter and the Armenian side in the former case. See more on legislation in 
Chapter 3. 
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government to establish bilateral treaties with the Russian regions containing high 
concentrations of recent Armenian émigrés. 
As specified by the state managed regime, the Armenian government would establish 
and oversee the operations of the official Foreign Employment Agency. The Agency 
will report to the executive branch of the Armenian government on a regular, e.g. 
monthly, basis on the recruitment and deployment process. A solid collaboration 
between the two entities is a necessity not only to ensure smooth operation of the 
recruitment and deployment schemes, but also to conduct background checks and 
provide final clearance for foreign employment to a migrant, in effect preventing 
individuals that either do not hold the required qualifications for the job or have either 
legal or social obligations in Armenia that require their presence in the country. Besides 
the Armenian government, the Agency will work in close cooperation with the Local 
Armenian Consulate in Russia and the dedicated entity within the regional Armenian 
Community Group in Russia that would be assigned the task of dealing with the 
temporary workers from Armenia. In turn, a special department at the RA Consulate, 
governed by the instructions from the Armenian government, will cooperate with the 
Agency, the Group and the administration in the Russian region on the labor migration 
issues. 
As must be obvious now, the Group within the Armenian Community will play a 
determining role in the process. It will be an intermediary entity between the Migrant, 
the Armenian government (through its consular representation in the specific region), 
the Foreign Employment Agency in Armenia, the Russian authorities and the employer 
in Russia. Needless, to say, this levies a heavy responsibility upon a community group. 
However, it is expected that the operations will be supported and encouraged by the 
Armenian government either directly or through the Consulates.  
We assume that the Russian authorities prefer dealing with the old Diaspora 
representative simply due to the common understanding of market and social needs in 
the specific region. Provided such justification at all levels the Armenian Community 
Group is able to then negotiate with the potential employers in Russia and often times 
find employment within Diaspora held enterprises. The group and the Consulate, in 
fact, should have shared responsibility over the process. The Employers are found and 
chosen by the Armenian Community Groups with the Russian authorities having a 
record of those employers approved for hiring temporary workers. This is an important 
consideration, since we are still talking about a developing system and a great deal of 
official regulation and sometimes management is required for the system to work. 
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The Flow 
In a simplified version the process flow in the model described above and in Figure 1.1 
can be presented as follows. We assume the environment of established bilateral treaties 
and operating Foreign Employment Agency in addition to the working relationship 
between the Consulate and the Armenian Community Group in Russia. There is an 
open and efficient flow of relevant information across all participants, ensuring smooth 
operation of the process. Following this procedure is the only legitimate process for a 
temporary migration opportunity for an Armenian migrant in Russia. Any other method 
of finding employment would require individual initiative on behalf of the migrant and 
confine him or her to strict Russian immigration laws. 
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Figure 5.1. Proposed Temporary Labor Migration Model between Armenia and 
Russia: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A hypothetical migrant then fills out an application at the Foreign Employment Agency 
in Armenia. The Agency takes no longer than two weeks, or any other specified period 
of time that is deemed efficient, to respond.92 During that time the Agency confirms all 
formalities with the Armenian Government. The Agency runs the Migrant’s 
qualifications across its database of open employment opportunities in Russia. The 
Armenian Consulate in Russia and the Armenian Community Group create the 
database. The latter maintains the database and shares with all three parties. Once the 
Migrant passes all the initial approval steps and a possible opportunity is determined the 
                                                 
92 The actual time frame in this study is not relevant, as long as it is reasonable amount, 
it can be worked out during the actual implementation of the scheme. 
Foreign Employment 
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Armenian Community Group in Russia 
Local Consulate of the 
Republic of Armenia in 
Russia 
Russian authorities [municipal, regional 
and federal levels] 
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information is sent to the Armenian Community Group that confirms whether the 
opportunity still exists and negotiates with the employer. This assumes the Agency has 
had a discussion with the Migrant regarding possible employment opportunities and has 
the Migrants’ agreement on that. Upon receiving confirmation from the Employer, the 
Armenian Community Group communicates that to the Consulate and the Employment 
Agency. The Migrant arriving on a special temporary work visa, a distant but viable 
situation, reports to the Armenian Consulate for initial registration and to the Armenian 
Community Group.  
The Group helps the Migrant to settle in the new environment, helping rent an 
apartment and providing basic information about their new location. A representative 
from the Group then introduces the Migrant to the future employer. During the length 
of the employment period the Armenian Community Group oversees the progress and 
receives regular reports from both the Migrant and the Employer.93 These reports will 
then be transmitted to the Employment Agency. Experience of other countries proves 
that such basic information about the working conditions, attitudes towards and 
concerns of the Migrants first helps create reliable statistical body for further analysis of 
the temporary labor migration impacts on both the host and home countries; and 
second, ensure that the Armenian executive branch in charge of the process, 
communicates diligently any concerns about Migrants’ well-being to its Consulates and 
the local authorities in Russia. After all, it is expected of the Government to assume 
responsibility for its citizens’ welfare and implement certain measures necessary to 
uphold it. At the end of the deployment period the process would have come full circle 
and the Migrant returns home, with the Armenian Community Group and the 
Employment Agency being the integral agents in ensuring that happens. As with other 
aspects, the Agency is expected to keep track of all Migrants that travel out of and into 
Armenia and report the statistics to the executive branch of the Armenian Government. 
Finally, and this must be stressed with all urgency, the Armenian Community Group, 
although capable and possessing the infrastructure, will perform as an efficient vehicle 
in the process only with the clear guidance, encouragement and, importantly, financial 
backing of the Armenian Government. The Armenian Consulates established in various 
Russian regions should work in close cooperation with the present “old” and “new” 
Diaspora communities in establishing such a working group. It is possible to envision 
                                                 
93 To simplify, it would make sense for the Migrant to have face-to-face meetings with 
the representatives of the Armenian Community Groups on a regular basis. 
Furthermore, a more practical approach would assume that the office of the Armenian 
Community Group is stationed in the same building with the RA Consulate in Russia. 
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other incentives, aside from holding a collective responsibility for its compatriots in 
Russia, however, that is beyond the scope of the present study. 
A final note must be added. In terms of economics, the above-mentioned model is 
viable in producing positive results as long as the process remains properly regulated 
and managed. Migrants should be encouraged to expatriate their capital home. 
Remittances should follow the official channels of the Pan-Armenian Bank type 
structure, as described earlier. Importantly, the employment agency should be involved 
in the local market as well and match the Migrant’s skills with the opportunities 
existing in Armenia, especially in the cases of the repeated migrants who possess new 
skills acquired as the result of the migration process. 
Presented as a hypothetical idea, the model does provide a reasonable framework for 
further analysis of the temporary labor migration processes from Armenia. An obvious 
extension to the current set up would be direct involvement of the Armenian Diaspora 
outside of Russia. This might become important in terms of providing financial support 
to the Armenian Community Groups in Russia who often lack the funds necessary to 
implement local initiatives. However, given the fragmented state of the Diaspora, the 
immediate functionality of this provision is doubtful.  
Nevertheless, for an Armenia facing uncontrolled mass migration, a big portion of 
which is temporary labor migration to Russia, it is vital to preserve its only main natural 
resource, human capital, and establish a guarantee of return. Implementing a temporary 
labor migration process, in our view, seems to do the job well. Moreover, such a regime 
will help alleviate negative, and clarify ambiguous, impacts of the migration process on 
Armenia’s economy. 
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Conclusion 
Over the past two decades Armenia has been experiencing a net population outflow as 
growing numbers of Armenian nationals have been leaving the country in search of 
economic opportunities abroad. The goal of this policy study was to draw attention to 
these trends, define the legal and economic analysis and contribute to developing 
migration policies based on best practices worldwide. International experience 
demonstrates that regulating temporary labor migration has numerous advantages. In 
the Armenian context, such a regulated regime mandated by the government can only 
become successful if it is carried out in cooperation with the Armenian Diaspora. As a 
case study, this paper looked at the labor migration trends from Armenia to Russia, a 
country that remains the most popular destination for economic migrants across the 
post-Soviet space. A concept model for the regulated temporary labor migration regime 
that involves all key participants in the migration project is offered as a starting point 
and basis of investigation for future studies and possible implementation. Assuming that 
a legal base is worked out on a bilateral level between Armenian and Russian 
governments, including individual agreements with Russian regions with a high density 
of Armenian populations, a pivotal intermediary role is assigned to the community 
groups of the Diaspora working with the Armenian and Russian authorities to 
streamline the migration process. 
The economic implications should be studied from multiple angles. The analysis 
presented in the paper proposes that, in the Armenian case, regulated temporary labor 
migration will have stimulating effects in the labor market, and therefore have a 
profound impact on reducing unemployment in the country. Returnees joining the home 
labor force with new skills contribute to wide spread economic development across all 
industries, with rising wages. That creates greater incentives for workers to stay in the 
home economy. Finally, remittances if channeled via formal means, as in the example 
with the Pan-Armenian Bank, have a potentially stronger impact, as the Bank would be 
in the position to fund certain infrastructure projects. Certainly, this analysis requires 
further expansion and detailed review. However, it offers a framework for future 
research on the issue. How all these factors come into play in Armenia is a subject of 
future research, backed by reliable and insightful econometric data currently today. 
While discussing the introduction of policies contributing to better regulation of 
migration processes and initiatives to transform labor migration into a regulated 
mechanism generating economic gains for Armenia, we should also keep in mind the 
social implications accompanying labor migration. First, “migration always has 
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demographic consequences for the sending country, even when it is temporary 
migration for employment purposes, since it separates spouses and reduces the birth 
rate.”94 Labor migration also might affect the socio-demographic situation at home. 
“Mass labor migration, even if it is seasonal, can have a very negative effect on 
marriages and birth rate in the home country.”95 Second, migrants commonly face the 
following challenges in the accepting country, in particular, in the Russian Federation: 
involvement in hazardous work, lack of legal status, and ethnic intolerance.96  
The key-takeaway of the discussion above is that implementation of the regulated 
temporary labor migration regime by the Armenian government with active 
participation of the Armenian Diaspora in the management process will bring clarity 
and predictability to the population movements in and out the country. Various schemes 
of the regime can be applied, with one being introduced in this paper. In the end, a 
regulated labor force flow is highly likely to have lasting positive implications for 
Armenia economically and socially. 
                                                 
94 Iontsev, 2000: 44 based on A. Sovi, 1977: 344 
95 Ibid, 41. 
96  See more on this in Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, E. Tjurjukanova, 2004. 
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Appendices 
 
Table 1.2: Sri Lanka - Foreign Employment By Country/Gender 2000-2004 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Country 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male  Female Male Female 
Saudi Arabia 26,161 35,198 26,672 40,013 27,622 43,868 25,812 50,283 23,893 46,998
Kuwait 5,340 28,293 6,041 29,059 6,686 35,156 6,770 31,853 7,039 29,494
U.A.E. 10,346 22,469 9,169 19,122 12,538 20,355 14,362 17,955 15,468 17,243
Lebanon 443 12,752 442 14,993 423 12,269 356 12,851 376 17,442
Jordan 383 6,971 447 7,629 388 6,146 520 6,562 1,177 7,722
Qatar 9,350 2,787 11,169 2,884 17,153 3,591 18,700 5,098 24,877 4,972
Oman 1,284 3,680 1,266 2,403 1,335 2,243 1,546 2,585 1,618 1,789
Bahrain 1,484 4,993 948 2,790 948 3,578 1,179 2,552 966 2,833
Cyprus 448 1,891 639 2,451 681 2,412 625 2,418 501 2,622
Maldives 2,078 977 1,727 665 1,500 1,395 2,090 1,103 2,111 343
Singapore 147 1,470 229 1,278 112 1,158 85 984 123 855
South Korea 654 201 280 73 421 101 1,798 238 1,182 122
Hong Kong 22 352 12 370 3 267 6 222 8 154
Malaysia 1,165 39 185 151 99 282 30 209 30 211
Other 488 322 581 319 613 430 629 424 610 684
Total 59,793 122,395 59,807 124,200 70,522 133,251 74,508 135,337 79,979 133,484
Source: Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment / Annual Statistical Report of Foreign Employment - 2004  
http://www.slbfe.lk/feb/stat_main.html 
 
 
Table 2.1: Armenia - Population Size, at the beginning of the year  
Year Total 
Population 
(1000 
persons) 
Urban (% 
of total 
population) 
Rural (% 
of total 
population) 
Males (% 
of total 
population) 
Females 
(% of total 
population) 
Labor 
Resources 
(1000 
persons)  
Economically 
Active (% of 
labor 
resources) 
Economically 
Non-active 
population 
(% of labor 
resources) 
Officially 
registered 
unemployed 
(% of labor 
resources)  
2005          
2004 3,215.8 64.2 35.8 48.2 51.8     
2003 3,212.2 64.2 35.8 48.1 51.9 2,008.4 61.4 38.6 6.2 
2002 3,210.3 64.3 35.7 48.0 52.0 1,976.9 62.7 37.3 6.8 
2001 3,212.9 64.6 35.4 48.0 52.0 2,406.2 58.7 41.3 6.1 
2000 3,215.3 66.7 33.3 48.6 51.4 2,357.4 61.4 38.6 7.2 
1999 3,803.4 66.8 33.2 48.6 51.4 2,288.0 63.9 36.1 7.2 
1998 3,798.2 66.9 33.1 48.5 51.5 2,251.0 65.6 34.4 6.2 
1997 3,791.2 67.0 33.0 48.4 51.6 2,173.3 70.8 29.2 7.6 
1996 3,780.7 67.3 32.7 48.4 51.6 2,153.7 73.5 26.5 6.9 
1995 3,766.4 67.5 32.5   2,132.6 74.2 25.8 5.0 
1994 3,740.2 67.7 32.3       
1991 3,574.5 69.5 30.5       
Source: NSS Statistical Yearbook of Armenia 2001-2004  
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Table 2.2: Total Migration into Russia (1000 persons)  
including migrants from:  
  
Migrants 
arriving into RF 
(total) CIS Armenia 
Jan-Jun 
2005 
 80.7 2.9 
Jan-Jun 
2004 
 42.9 1.4 
2004 119.2 110.3 3.1 
2003 129.2 119.6 5.1 
2002 184.6 177.3 6.8 
2001 193.5 186.2 5.8 
2000 359.3 350.3 15.9 
1997 597.7 582.8 19.1 
Source: Federal State Statistic Service of Russia; Federal Migration Service of the Government of the 
Russian Federation 
 
Table 2.3: Migration from Armenia to Russia 
 Total number of 
Armenian emigrants to 
CIS (GoA data) 
Armenia’s share of 
immigrants in Russia (RF 
data) 
Ratio of Armenian 
immigrants in Russia 
2004  3.1  
2003 7.7 5.1 66 
2002 8.5 6.8 80 
2001 10.7 5.8 54 
2000 11.1 15.9 143 
1999 6.9   
1998 8.1   
1997 8.1 19.1 235 
1996 7.3   
1995 10.4   
Sources: NSS Statistical Yearbooks of Armenia 2001-2004; Federal Statistical Service (RF); authors’ 
estimates 
 
Table 2.4: Migrants by urban and rural areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AST, “Labor Migration from Armenia, 
2002-2005” 
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Table 2.6: Employment status and industry of Armenian migrants in Armenia  
 
 
Source: AST, “Labor Migration from Armenia, 2002-2005” 
 
 
Table 2.5: Migrants by age and gender  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AST, “Labor Migration from Armenia, 2002-2005” 
 
Table 2.7: CIS citizens officially working in the 
Russian Federation 
  Jan-Jun 2004   Jan-Jun 2005   
 1000 persons % 1000 persons % 
Total 162,1 100 236,5 100 
Ukraine 82,5 50,9 94,8 40,1
Moldova 19,7 12,2 24,2 10,2
Uzbekistan 16,3 10,0 33,9 14,3
Tajikistan 14,2 8,8 34,9 14,8
Armenia 11,8 7,3 19,5 8,3 
Azerbaijan 6,3 3,9 12,2 5,1 
Kyrgyzia  5,3 3,2 10,7 4,5 
Kazakhstan 3,3 2,0 3,1 1,3 
Georgia 2,6 1,6 2,9 1,2 
Turkmenistan 0,2 0,1 0,3 0,1 
Source: Federation Migration Service of Russian Federation 
Sphere of employment Percent 
Services 22,9 
Construction 16,3 
Agriculture 15,9 
Trade/public food 15,4 
Production 9,3 
Transport 6,6 
Education 4,4 
Science 2,2 
Art 2,2 
Other 4,8 
Total 100,0 
Migration rate  
(ratio of migrants to total 
number of household members 
in the given age group, %) Age group 
Total Males Fema
les 
16-20 0,4 0,6 0,3 
21-25 6,0 10,9 1,5 
26-30 7,5 12,8 1,6 
31-35 7,5 14,2 1,8 
36-40 7,6 14,6 2,0 
41-45 7,9 15,1 3,1 
46-50 9,8 17,4 2,1 
51-55 5,2 10,6 0,6 
56-60 2,7 4,6 0,2 
61-65 2,3 4,3 0,1 
66 and above 0,8 1,3 0,1 
Total 4,1 9,2 1,3 
0%
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USA 2.6 11.1
EU 4.1 13.9
CIS 93.3 75
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Unemployed
49.3%
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jobs
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 60
 
Table 3.1: Annual Quotas for Issuing Invitations for Employment to Foreigners and 
authorizations for temporary residency status in Russia 
Year Total number of invitations Total number of authorizations 
2006 329300 107425 
2005 214000 108001 
2004 213000 205633 
2003 530000 439080 
Source: RF Government website/Normative Documents  
 
Table 3.2: Distribution of Quotas On Temporary Residence in Selected Regions of Russia 
Region of the Russian Federation  2006 2005 2004 2003 
Central Federal District (okrug) – Total –                        26450      
Including:     
Moscow Region (oblast) 6200   6300 8000 550 
Moscow  1000   1000 1500 90.000 
North-Western Federal District - Total                         10280    
Including:     
Leningrad Region (oblast) 1000   5000 5000 6500 
Saint-Petersburg 2000   2000 1000 1000 
South Federal District (okrug) – Total 8600 
Including:     
Krasnodar Region (krai) 1000   500 500 500 
Stavropol Region (krai) 500   500 1000 1000 
Rrostov Region (oblast) 1500   1000 1000 3200 
Sibir’ Federal District – Total  18745  
Including:     
Krasnoyarsk Region (krai) 2000   2000 2000 1200 
Source: Addendum to the decree of the Government of Russian Federation, 21 November 2005, No 1990-p 
“Distribution of quota on the issue of temporary residence permits to foreign citizens and individuals 
without citizenship, for 2006, by the subjects of the Russian Federation” (“Raspredeleniye kvoty na 
vydachu inostrannym grazhdanam i litsam bez grazhdanstva priglasheniy na vremennoye prozhivaniye v 
Rossisckoi FEderatsii na 2006-i god po subiektam Rossiskoi Federatsii”) and respective decrees for the 
following years. 
 
Table 4.1: Republic of Armenia: Selected Economic Indicators, 2001-2005 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 [prog.] 
Real Sector           
Real GDP growth (percent change) 9.6 13.2 13.9 10.1 8
GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars) 2,120 2,373 2,805 3,552 4,217
GNI per capita 680 767 902 1,118 1,326
External Sector           
Current account balance (including transfers)           
In millions of U.S. dollars -200 -148 -191 -167 -213
In percent of GDP -9.5 -6.2 -6.8 -4.7 -5.1
External debt           
In millions of U.S. dollars 906 1,026 1,098 1,183 1,229
In percent of exports of goods and services 132 131 87 74 67
Gross official international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars) 329 430 502 541 582
In months of imports of goods and services 3.6 3.7 4 3.9 3.9
Sources: Armenian authorities; and IMF Staff estimates - 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05123.htm 
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Chart 4.1: Armenia’s Unemployment Rate Trend, based on the IFS Database 
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